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Welcome!

November 5th, 2010
Welcome to the 9th Annual IP Law Conference at the Golden Gate University School of
Law. This year’s conference, titled Recent Developments in Intellectual Property Law
and Policy, adds a new dimension to prior conferences – a focus on policy issues
pertaining to IP law. We have previously limited our presentations to practice-oriented
approaches, however we recognize that IP law practice is increasingly affected, in very
significant ways, by the policy issues that underlie the law.
To address these policy issues, we are pleased to bring IP law professors Madhavi Sunder
(U.C. Davis School of Law) and Dan Burk (U.C, Irvine School of Law) to present their
cutting-edge recent scholarship on social networking sites and on the Patent system.
Continuing our tradition of providing updates on recent developments in IP law, we also
have panels on trademark and patent law so practitioners and students can become aware
of key new developments in these critical IP fields of practice.
We are also excited to add a new subject matter to our program this year: online gaming
law. Veteran IP lawyer Neil Smith has put together a panel of expert attorneys, including
in-house counsel from Electronic Arts and Zynga, for what promises to be an insightful
look at issues in this rapidly changing area of the law.
The IP Law Center has continued this year to bring important participants in the IP bar
and academy to the University to present their views as part of our Distinguished IP Law
Speaker Series. Professor Pamela Samuelson of Berkeley Law School offered a brilliant
analysis of the Google Book Search Settlement in remarks she presented on October 7th,
and this coming April 11th, 2011 the Center will welcome Ninth Circuit Chief Judge Alex
Kozinski as our third Distinguished IP Law Speaker.
The Center’s online presence continues to grow as well. Our highly praised IP Law Book
Review will issue its second volume early in 2011, and Professor Greenberg’s IP Buzz
blog continues to address new issues and cases in IP Law. Bookmark the main site page,
www.gguiplc.com to stay abreast of all of the Center’s activities and to link to the review
and blog.

536 Mission Street
San Francisco, CA
94105-2968
Tel: 415.442.6600
Fax: 415.442.6609
ww.ggu.edu/law
iplaw@ggu.edu

Lastly, enjoy the conference, and let us know what you think of the program. We are
always looking for ways to improve your experience, and thank you for your attendance
and support of IP law at Golden Gate.
Sincerely,

Marc Greenberg

William Gallagher

Chester Chuang

Marc Greenberg
Marc H. Greenberg is Professor of Law,
founding Director, and currently Co-Director
of the Intellectual Property Law Center and
Program at Golden Gate University of Law. A
member of the faculty since 2000, he teaches
Intellectual Property Survey, Internet and
Software Law, Intellectual Property and New
Technology, and Entertainment Law in the IP
curriculum. He also teaches Civil Procedure,
Business Associations and related courses in
the general curriculum. He is the 2010-2011
Chair of the Art Law Section of the American
Association of Law Schools, and is a past cochair of the Copyright Section of the San
Francisco Intellectual Property Law
Association.
Professor Greenberg received his A.B. degree in English Literature from the
University of California, Berkeley; his J.D. from the University of California,
Hastings College of the Law, where he served as an articles editor of the
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly and published the first of his scholarly
works analyzing the First Amendment cases of the Supreme Court's 1978
term.
Professor Greenberg's scholarship has focused on legal issues pertaining to
content on the Internet, obscenity law in online contexts, and copyright issues
both in the U.S and in China. He is presently working on a series of articles
focusing on comic books, graphic novels and the law. His articles have been
published in the Berkeley Technology Law Journal, The Syracuse Journal of
Law and Technology, The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law,
and The Loyola Chicago University Journal of International Law.
Before joining the GGU faculty, Professor Greenberg practiced IP,
entertainment and business law, in both transactional work as well as
litigation, in several firms in Northern California. He was of counsel to
Chickering and Gregory in San Francisco and was a managing partner in his
own firm, Nelsen and Greenberg, also in San Francisco.

William Gallgher
William Gallagher is Associate Professor
and Co-Director of the IP Law Center at the
Golden Gate University School of Law,
where he teaches courses on intellectual
property litigation, intellectual property
law, torts, and legal ethics. He is also
currently a Visiting Scholar at the Center
for the Study of Law and Society at the UC
Berkeley School of Law (2009-2010). He
currently serves on the Executive
Committee of the State Bar of California’s
IP Law Section.
Professor Gallagher previously taught as a lecturer in intellectual
property law and ethics at the Santa Clara University School of Law. He
received his JD from the UCLA School of Law; his Ph.D. from the
University of California , Berkeley School of Law (Jurisprudence and
Social Policy Program); his MA from the University of Chicago; and his BA
from the University of California, Berkeley .
Professor Gallagher is the author of articles on intellectual property law
and professional ethics, which have appeared in the Santa Clara Law
Review, Pepperdine Law Review, Law and Social Inquiry, Center for the
Study of Law and Society/Jurisprudence and Social Policy Program Faculty
Working Papers (University of California, Berkeley School of Law), and the
Law and Politics Book Review. His edited book, International Essays in
Law and Society: Intellectual Property, was published in 2007 by Ashgate
Press.
Before entering full-time academia, Professor Gallagher was a partner in
the San Francisco office of Townsend and Townsend and Crew LLP, where
he specialized in patent, copyright, trademark, trade secret, and related
intellectual property litigation in both state and federal courts
nationwide.
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ChesterChuangisanassociateprofessorat
theGoldenGateUniversitySchoolofLaw,
whereheteachescontractsandpatentlaw.
Hisresearchfocusesonpatentlaw.

ProfessorChuangreceivedhisJ.D.fromthe
NewYorkUniversitySchoolofLawandhisB.S.inPharmacyfromthe
OhioStateUniversity.Heistheauthorofarticleswhichhaveappeared
intheEmployeeRightsandEmploymentPolicyJournal(ChicagoKent
CollegeofLaw)andtheNewYorkUniversityLawReview.Hislatest
article,UnjustPatents&BargainingBreakdown:WhenisDeclaratory
ReliefNeeded?,willbepublishedbytheS.M.U.LawReviewinMarch
2011.

Priortoenteringacademia,ProfessorChuangwasSr.Corporate
CounselforElectronicsForImaging,Inc.,aleaderindigitalimagingand
printmanagementsolutionsforthecommercialprintingandenterprise
markets.HealsoworkedpreviouslyasanassociatewithO'Melveny&
MyersandPerkinsCoie,specializinginIPlicensingandlitigation,and
servedasajudicialclerkfortheHon.SaundraBrownArmstrong,U.S.
DistrictCourt,N.D.Cal.

Justin T. Beck
Partner
Beck, Ross, Bismonte
& Finley LLP
Justin T. Beck is a partner in
the firm of Beck, Ross,
Bismonte & Finley LLP in San
Jose California, where he
specializes in intellectual
property litigation. Before
the founding of Beck Ross in
2006, Mr. Beck was of
counsel to the firm of Mount & Stoelker P.C. and was
previously a partner in the Silicon Valley firm of Skjerven
Morrill LLP, where he had practiced since 1985. Mr. Beck
is a 1965 graduate of Stanford University, and received
his J.D. magna cum laude in 1972 from the University of
San Francisco. Mr. Beck is an adjunct professor at both
Golden Gate University School of Law and the University
Of Oregon School Of Law teaching copyright law and
patent litigation. He also writes frequently on intellectual
property issues.
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How Are These Alike?

Golden Gate University Law School
9th Annual Conference on Recent
Developments in Intellectual Property Law
November 5, 2010
Robert Morrill
Sidley Austin LLP
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Justin Beck
Beck, Ross, Bismonte & Finley LLP

Patent Marking
False Marking
The Rise and Probable Fall of a Legal Fad

False Marking
• §292 (a): “Whoever marks …or uses in
advertising in connection with any
unpatented article . . . Any word or number
importing that the same is patented for the
purpose of deceiving the public . . . Shall be
fined not more that $500 for every such
offense.”
• §292 (b): “Any person may sue for the
penalty, in which event one-half shall go to
the person suing and the other to the use of
the United States.”

• §287 – The public is given notice that an
article is patented by marking with the
word “patent” or “pat.” and the patent
number. If there is a failure to mark, no
damages shall be recovered in any action
for infringement except on proof that the
infringer had been put on notice.

Qui Tam
• English common law permitted private
enforcement of the King’s laws.
• Adopted by the United States in the 19th
Century but fell out of use with the growth
of government agencies
• § 292, originally enacted in 1842, is one
of a handful of qui tam survivors

1

§292 slumbered for a century

Then Along Came:
Forest Group, Inc.
v. Bon Tool Co.,
590 F.3d 1295,
1303 (Fed. Cir.
Dec. 28, 2009)

What is an “offense”

What’s the Difference?
The Solo Cup Example

• § 292’s maximum penalty is $500 for each
“offense” – but what is an offense?
• Courts generally followed the 1st Circuit in
holding that a continuous series of false
markings was a single offense
• In December, the Federal Circuit took a
fresh look and held that each falsely
marked article was a separate offense

• The trial court, applying the 1st Circuit
rule, found three offenses, with a
maximum penalty of $1500
• Under the Federal Circuit rule
–20+ billion offenses
–$10,800,000,000,000 maximum
penalty

The Federal Circuit’s Green Light
• “Forest argues that interpreting the fine of
§ 292 to apply on a per article basis would
encourage "a new cottage industry" of
false marking litigation by plaintiffs who
have not suffered any direct harm. This,
however, is what the clear language of the
statute allows”
Forest Group, Inc. v. Bon Tool Co., 590 F.3d
1295, 1303 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 28, 2009)

2

False Marking Filings

Defendants Fight Back

600
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Constitutional Issues
• Standing
– No individual injury
– Assignment of sovereign claim
– Stauffer v. Brooks Bros. Inc., ___F.3d ___
(Fed. Cir. August 31, 2010)

• “Take Care” Clause
– Intervention by U.S. as of right

Expired Patents
• Many innocent explanations:
– Didn’t know the patent expired
– Somebody dropped the ball
– Waiting for the tooling to wear out

• The Brooks Brothers hint:
– We remand for the court to address. . . Brooks
Brothers’ motion to dismiss . . . “on the grounds that
the complaint fails to state a plausible claim to relief
because it fails to allege an ‘intent to deceive’ the
public – a critical element of a section 292 claim –
with sufficient specificity to meet the heightened
pleading requirements for claims of fraud imposed by”
Rule 9(b).

Intent
• Clontech Laboratories Inc v. Invitrogen
Corp., 406 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(Defendant has burden of proving it had a
reasonable belief marking was proper)
• Pequignot v. Solo Cup Company, 608
F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Specific intent
to deceive the public required; merely
knowing that marking is false and public
may be deceived insufficient)

Pleadings
• Rule 8 –notice pleading
• Rule 9(b) – “In alleging fraud or mistake, a
party must state with particularity the
circumstances constituting fraud or
mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, and
other conditions of a person's mind may
be alleged generally.”
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In the District Courts
• Many courts follow the
Brinkmeier cases
applying Rule 9(b) to
dismiss cases absent
specific facts
• Some district courts ,
including the Eastern
District of Texas, hold
9(b) does not apply, or is
satisfied by general
allegations

In re BP Lubricants
• Petition for Writ of Mandamus filed 9/29
after court denied motion to dismiss.
Petitioner seeks to have the strict pleading
requirement adopted
• The United States has filed an amicus
brief supporting the petitioner

Legislation

Looking Ahead

• S 515 pending in Senate amended to limit
§ 292(b) actions to recovery of competitive
injury
• HR 4954 would limit actions to recovery
for competitive injury to the plaintiff
• HR 6352 would limit recoveries for all
offenses in the aggregate to $500 and limit
standing

• BP Lubricants will likely tighten the
pleading requirements and make it difficult
for plaintiffs to properly plead a claim for
relief.
• Patent reform, whenever it is enacted, will
amend § 292(b), limiting private actions to
recovery for competitive injury

False Marking Suits – The End?
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Robert Morrill
Partner
Sidley Austin LLP
Robert Morrill is a partner in
Sidley’s Palo Alto office, where
he specializes in intellectual
property and business litigation.
He has resolved or tried patent,
trade secret, trademark,
copyright, unfair competition,
wrongful termination, trade
secret, license and contract disputes for clients in many industries,
including semiconductors, semiconductor manufacturing
equipment, computer hardware and software, telecommunications,
electronics, medical devices, gaming and pharmaceuticals. His
practice includes cases before the United States International Trade
Commission, as well as in the Federal and State courts and in
arbitration.
Mr. Morrill also has extensive experience as a neutral arbitrator or
mediator, including international arbitration in the ICC
International Court of Arbitration and the International Center for
Dispute Resolution. He has been appointed Special Master by the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California and the
Santa Clara County Superior Court, and he serves as an Early
Neutral Evaluator and Mediator for the U.S. District Court.
Before joining Sidley in 2003, Mr. Morrill was a founding partner
at the law firm of Skjerven Morrill LLP.

THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT TAKES ON
PATENT DAMAGES REFORM

Players in the Damages Debate
• Patent damages is the biggest obstacle to patent
reform
• Electronics/internet (Coalition for Patent Reform)
– Google, Apple and others who get sued over patents – 730
suits 1996‐2008
– Limit damages from “patent extortion”

• Big pharma, universities (and trolls)
– Patent licensors
– Keep things the way they are
– The Coalition is “aiming to infringe”
2

Damages Reform in Congress

Damages Reform in the Federal Circuit

• 2007 Draft: Judge conducts an analysis to ensure
that a reasonable royalty is applied only to the
portion of the infringing product properly
attributable to the claimed invention
• Current Draft: District Judges act as “gatekeepers”
who identify the “methodologies and factors that are
relevant to the determination of damages” and allow
the jury to “consider only those methodologies and
factors relevant to making such determination.“

• Former Chief Judge Michel: excessive
damages are “mythology” not reflected in the
case law
• Current law is flexible, allows district courts to
consider many factors. Proposed reform is
inflexible and overly constrains fact‐finder
• The Federal Circuit has set about to prove that
it is up to patent damages reform

3
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What’s at Stake?

The Measure of Damages
• “damages adequate to compensate for the
infringement, but in no event less than a
reasonable royalty “ 35 U.S.C. § 284
• Two types of patent damages:

• $357M: Lucent v. Gateway (2009)
• $184M: Cornell v. Hewlett‐Packard
(2009)
• $240M: i4i v. Microsoft (2009)
5

– Lost profits – usually lost sales
– Reasonable royalty

• For a reasonable royalty,

6

– What is the royalty base?
– What is the royalty rate?
– Royalty base x royalty rate = damage award

Experts Long Ruled the
Reasonable Royalty Roost

The Entire Market Value Rule

• Few cases on reasonable royalty until 2009
• Wide latitude for experts

A reasonable royalty may be based on the
entire value of an infringing product which
incorporates the patented feature, if the
invention is the basis for consumer demand

– Hypothetical license negotiation using the Georgia
Pacific
– Royalty rate often set by “Rule of Thumb” that the
licensee would be willing to pay 25% of its profits
– All industry licenses were “comparable”
– Royalty base was often the end product under the
entire market value rule
7
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Lucent v. Gateway
• “Date‐Picker” feature in Microsoft Outlook
• Lucent’s expert used:
– Entire Market Value Rule
– Comparable licenses, both lump‐sum and running
royalty

• Lucent sought $561M in running royalties
(8%)
• Microsoft suggested a lump sum of $6.5M
• Jury awarded a $357M lump sum
• Damages reversed, “no substantial evidence”
9

Lucent v. Gateway Royalty Rate
• Actual license rates for similar technology can
be probative of a “reasonable royalty”
• Lucent’s licenses?
– Some “comparable” licenses were cross‐licenses
or licenses to entire portfolios with no shown
relevance
– “Doubtful the technology is in any way similar”
– No showing of how to calculate percentage
royalty using lump sum or “dollars per unit”
licenses
11

Lucent v. Gateway EMVR/Royalty Base
• “lack of evidence demonstrating the patented method of the
Day patent as the basis—or even a substantial basis—of the
consumer demand for Outlook”
• “the infringing use of the date‐picker tool on Outlook is but a
very small component of a much larger software program”
• “no evidence that anybody anywhere at any time ever bought
Outlook . . . because it had a date picker”
• “the invention is not the reason consumers purchase Outlook”
• “Date‐picker” was “but a tiny feature,” one of “hundreds if not
thousands or even more features” in Outlook

10

Lucent v. Gateway
Relationship of Base and Rate
• The value of the entire product may be
used for a royalty base, particularly
where there is no market for the
infringing component, if the royalty rate
adjusts for the proportion of the base
represented by the infringing feature
• “Real world” licenses often do this

Cornell v. Hewlett‐Packard
Cornell’s First Damages Theory

Cornell v. Hewlett‐Packard
• Invention: A component of the instruction recorder
buffer in the processor (CPU)
– Instruction recorder buffer
• Is part of

• Damages base is all HP sales of servers and
workstations, using the entire market value
rule
• Judge Rader:

– CPU chip
• Which goes into

– CPU module
• Which goes into

– CPU “bricks”
• Which go into

– HP servers and workstations

•13 Smallest salable unit was the CPU

14

Cornell v. Hewlett‐Packard
Cornell’s Second Damages Theory
• Damages based on sales of CPU bricks, using
the entire market value rule
• Jury: 0.8% royalty on $23B sales = $184M
• HP moved for JMOL or remittitur

15

Cornell v. Hewlett‐Packard
Entire Market Value Thrown Out
• No evidence that the patented feature drove
customer demand for bricks (or for HP products)
• No evidence connecting customer demand for
computer performance to the claimed invention
• Cornell’s expert “included earnings from the sale
of many components of Hewlett‐Packard's
products that are not covered at all by the
claimed invention.”
• Damages reduced to $53M based on CPU sales
16

i4i v. Microsoft
• XML editor in Microsoft Word
• 25% “rule of thumb” and Microsoft’s 76.6 profit
margin were applied to a $499 “benchmark”
alternative product, and adjusted upward with G‐P
factors to a royalty of $98 per unit
• Possible to buy a copy of Microsoft Word for $98
• Jury awarded $200M plus $40M in enhanced
damages

17

– Interrupted the trial to conduct a Daubert hearing
– “The Federal Circuit has limited application of the Entire
Market Value Rule to instances where “the patent‐related
feature is the basis for customer demand” for an accused
product that nevertheless contains other features.”
– “Cornell did not . . . Attempt in any way to link consumer
demand for servers and workstations to the claimed
invention.”

i4i v. Microsoft Continued
• Questioning during oral argument:
– The court did not like the 25% rule
– The court did not like the failure to apportion the
value of the patented feature relative to the price
of the product

• Affirmed: Sufficiency of the evidence not
challenged
– “had Microsoft filed a pre‐verdict JMOL, it is true
that the outcome might have been different”
18

Lessons
• Federal Circuit is finally paying attention to
reasonable royalty damages
• “Anything goes” days of expert witnesses are over
• Evidence will be rigorously reviewed by appellate
and trial courts
• Comparable licenses must really be comparable

More Lessons
• The 25% rule has little or no support at the Federal
Circuit
• Reasonable royalty analysis must set the value of the
patented feature relative to the entire product
• Evidence of customer demand for patented feature
is necessary for the entire market value rule
– “Demand curves”
– “Customer surveys”

– Comparable technology
– Comparable economic circumstances

• Licenses in settlement of litigation should be used
19

• Defendant should always properly move for JMOL
20

Patent Law Update
Robert B. Morrill Sidley Austin LLP
Justin T. Beck Beck, Ross, Bismonte & Finley LLP

Notes

Madhav i Sunder
Professor of Law
UC Dav is School of Law
Education
x B.A., Social Studies, Harvard University 1992
x J.D., Stanford University 1997

Professor Sunder is a 2006 Carnegie Scholar and a leading scholar in the legal regulation
of culture. Her work traverses numerous legal fields, from intellectual property and
cultural property to human rights law and the First Amendment. She asks how age-old
legal doctrines impede, rather than facilitate, change and modernity within traditional
cultures. Adopting an interdisciplinary method, she argues that cultural studies and
globalization studies can help us to modernize antiquated laws for the 21st century. Her
recent publications include: "IP3," Stanford Law Review (2006), "The Invention of
Traditional Knowledge," Law & Contemporary Problems (2007); "The Romance of the
Public Domain," California Law Review (2004); "Piercing the Veil," Yale Law Journal
(2003); and "Cultural Dissent," Stanford Law Review (2001). She has authored numerous
comments and chapters in books and is the editor of Gender and Feminist Theory in Law
and Society (2006). She is a contributor to Findlaw.com.
Special Interests
Intellectual Property (Including International Intellectual Property), Law And Cultural
Studies, Cyberlaw, Women's Rights
Selected Career Highlights
x Carnegie Corporation Scholar 2006-2008
x "IP3" paper selected for Stanford/Yale Jr. Faculty Forum (2006)
x Honored as one of four "top young IP scholars" (by Lawrence Lessig, Professor of
Law, Stanford Law School, 2006)
Selected Publications
x IP3, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 257 (2006)
x Piercing the Veil, 112 YALE L. J. 1399 (2003). Excerpted in JUST ADVOCACY:
WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS, TRANSNATIONAL FEMINISM, AND THE POLITICS OF
REPRESENTATION (Wendy Hesford & Wendy Kozol, eds.) (2004).
x Cultural Dissent, 54 STAN. L. REV. 495 (2001).
x Everyone's a Superhero: A Cultural Theory of Mary Sue Fan Fiction as Fair Use, 95
Cal. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2007) (with Anupam Chander)

iP: YouTube, MySpace, Our Culture
Madhavi Sunder
Professor of Law, UC Davis School of Law

Notes

CURRICULUM VITAE
NEIL ARTHUR SMITH
Ropers, Majeski, Kohn & Bentley
201 Spear Street, Suite 1000
San Francisco, CA 94105-1667
Tel.: 408/918-4523 Fax: 408/918-4501
nsmith@rmkb.com
EMPLOYMENT EXPERIENCE:
Private Law Practice: Partner, Ropers Majeski Kohn & Bentley in San Francisco and San Jose,
California, specializing in patent, trademark, trade secret, unfair competition and copyright matters;
private mediation for intellectual property cases (2010- ).
Private Law Practice: Partner in law firms in San Francisco, California, specializing in patent, trademark,
trade secret, unfair competition and copyright matters; private mediation for intellectual property cases
(2001-2010).
Private Law Practice: Partner, Limbach & Limbach L.L.P., San Francisco, California, specializing in
patent, trademark, unfair competition, trade secret, and copyright matters (1974-2000).
Law Clerk: To Judge Giles S. Rich, United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in Washington,
D.C. (Predecessor to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) (1972-1974 ).
Patent Attorney: United States Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, D.C. (1969-1972).
EDUCATION:
L.L.M. in Patent and Trade Regulation Law, George Washington Law School, 1973.
J.D. Columbia Law School, Columbia University, 1969. Stone Scholar.
B.S. in Mechanical Engineering, Columbia School of Engineering and Applied Science, Columbia
University, 1966. Tau Beta Pi.
B.A. in Physical Sciences, Columbia College, Columbia University, 1965.
PUBLICATIONS:
Author of numerous articles on patent, trademark, and copyright law, trade secret protection, Internet law
issues, anticounterfeiting remedies and gray market subjects, including: "Complex Patent Suits: The Use
of Special Masters for Claim Construction" 2, Landslide 1, Oct. 2009 (American Bar Association), “The
Interface Between Antitrust Law and Trade Secret Law,” 3, The Corporate Analyst, No. 1, p. 134, Nov.
1990, "Fraud Upon the Patent Office as a Violation of the Sherman Antitrust Law," 53 Journal of the
Patent Office Society 337, 423; "The Collateral Estoppel Effect of a Prior Judgment of Patent Invalidity:
Blonder-Tongue Revisited," 55 Journal of the Patent Office Society 285, 363, 436, 1973; "Obtaining
Early and Effective Relief Against Trademark Counterfeiting," 10 COMM/ENT, Hastings College of the
Law, No. 4, p. 1049, Summer 1988; author of Chapter 71 entitled "Discovery in Trademark Cases in the
Courts and Trademark Trial and Appeal Board for Intellectual Property Counseling and Litigation; author
of Chapter 10 entitled “Trademarks, Creation Protection and Valuation,” for The Trademark Law of the
United States; author of quarterly column entitled" Ninth Circuit Report,” for “New Matter,” a
Publication of the State Bar of California Intellectual Property Section and, in ABA Litigation Section IP
Division Newsletter; contributing author to book, Risky Business: Protect Your Business from Being
Stalked, Conned, or Blackmailed on the Web, by Daniel S. Janal, John Wiley Sons, Inc., 1998. Author,
RC1/5685235.2/MC2

Chapter "New Strategies for Infringement Litigation" Recent Trends in Patent Infringement Lawsuits.
Aspotore/Thomson, 2010; Editorial Advisory Board, IP Litigator, Editorial Advisory Board, Internet
Law & Business.
LECTURES AND COURSES:
Speaker on several trademark, patent and unfair competition, and alternative dispute resolution subjects to
various bar associations, law schools, and IP law organizations, including San Francisco Patent Law
Association, San Francisco Barristers Club, the California, Colorado, Washington State, Ohio, Oregon
and Utah State Bar Associations; Intellectual Property Associations in Los Angeles, San Diego, Pacific
Northwest; American Patent Institute, Patent Bar Review course; Practicing Law Institute (PLI),
American Bar Association, Litigation Section, Science & Technology and IP Law Sections, Copyright
Society, United States Trademark Association, American Intellectual Property Law Association,
International Trademark Association, Computer Law Association, Stanford Law School, Hastings Law
School, Golden Gate Law School, University of California Law School, Santa Clara Law School, speaker
on Digital Technology and The Internet Conferences, American Conference Inst.; Testified on the Draft
Report of the United States Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights of the National Information
Infrastructure Task Force, and the World Intellectual Property Organization; U.S. Reporter for ALAI on
the subject of technical devices for the protection of copyrights in digital works.
BAR ASSOCIATION ACTIVITIES AND RELATED OFFICES HELD:
Served in the following capacities: President, San Francisco Patent and Trademark Law Association;
American Intellectual Property Law Association: Board of Directors, Trademark and Committee
Chairman, Licensing, Federal Courts Committee Chairman; American Bar Association, PTC Section:
Chairman of Divisions (Trademarks), and (Other IP Committees), Chairman Trademark and Trade Name,
Copyright, Trade Secret Committees and Trademark Office Affairs Committee, PTC Section delegate to
ABA RICO Committee; Member, Advisory Board of the Patent, Trademark and Copyright Journal of the
Bureau of National Affair; State Bar of California: Executive Committee Member, Patent and Trademark
Section, International Law Section, Officer, and State Bar Conference of Delegates; Former member,
U.S. Dept. of Commerce Public Advisory Committee on Trademark Office Affairs; Trustee, United
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Ninth Circuit Report
not authorize the importation of the
watches into the United States or the
sales made by Costco, and filed this
copyrighr infringement in the Central
Districr of California. The parties filed
cross motions for summary judgment,
with Costco arguing that the "first sale
doctrine" under 17 U.S.c. § 109(a)
applied to provide a defense to any
copyright infringement.

The First Sale Doctrine
The firstsale doctrine ofCopyrightAct
§ 109 (a) provides: "Notwithstanding

Neil A. Smith

Ropers Majeski Kohn & Bentley

COPYRIGHT FIRST SALE
DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY TO
GOODS WHICH ARE PURCHASED
OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES
AND IMPORTED INTO THE
UNITED STATES
Omega S.A., v. Costco Wholesale
Corporation ___ F.3d ___ (9th

Clr. September 3, 2008)
OMEGA

MANUFACTURES

WATCHES

In

Switzerland and sells them throughout
the world and in the United States.
Each watch has on the back an "Omega
Globe Design" which has been copyrighted in the United States, no doubt
with the view to use the copyright to
keep out foreign goods such as those at
issue here.
Discount store Costco purchases
watches on the "gray market" from
ENE Limited, a New York company,
which purchased the watches from
authorized Omega watch dealers overseas. Alt hough Omega auth ori zed the
initial foreign sale of the watches, it did
New Matter
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the provisions of section 106(3), the
owner of a particular copy.. .lawfully
made under this tirle, or any person
authorized by such owner, is entirled,
without the authority of the copyright
owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of
the possession of that copy...."
Section 602 (a) of the Copyright Act
prevents importarion of copies of copyrighred works into the United States,
without the authority of the owner
of copyright: "Importation into the
United States, without the authority of
the owner of copyright under this tirle,
of copies ... of a work that have been
acquired outside the United Srates is an
infringement of the exclusive right to
distribute copies ... under section 106,
actionable under section 501." Further,
section 106(3 ) of the Copyright Act
gives a copyright owner control of distribution. It stares: "Subjecr to secrions
107 through 122, the owner of copyright under this tirle has the exclusive rights ... to distribute copies ... of
the copyrighted work to rhe public
by sale or other transfer of ownership,
or by rental, lease, or lending." The
question here is the interplay between
the three sections, the first sale doctrine, the exclusive right to distribute,

and the right to prevent importation,
which rightfully belong to the copyright owner.
The District Court granted summary judgment to Costco applying the
first sale doctrine.
In its 1998 decision Quality King
D istributors, Inc. v. Lanza Resea rch
International, Inc., l the Supreme Court
held the first sale doctr ine ro provide a defense allowing a defendant to
sell copyrighted goods which had been
manufactured in the United States,
shipped outside the United States, and
then ultimately imp orted back and sold
into the United States without the
consent of the copyright owner. In this
case, the Omega watches were actually manufactured and obtained abroad
from an authorized foreign distributor,
then brought in through importati on
into the U.S. by ESS, and then sold here
by Costco.
The Court noted that before Quality
King was decided by the Supreme Court,
Ninth Circuit precedent was clear that
the first sale provision § 109 (a) provided no defense against a claim of
infringement for importation of goods
which had been made outside the United
States, unless the goods had already been
first sold in the United States with the
permission of the copyright owner.
The defendant, Costco had argued,
and the District court had held, that prior
Ninth Circuit decisions had been implicirly overruled by the Quality King decision of the Supreme Court. For example,
the Ninth Circuit had previously held in
BMG Music v. Perez," that the first sale
doctrine provided no defense against a
claim of unlawful importation under 602
(a) against foreign-manufactured imported goods. As the court there said, the
words "lawfully made under this tirle" in

§ 109(a) "grant first sale protection only
to copies legally made and sold in the
United States," and the copies at issue
there were made and first sold abroad.

The Ninth Circuit in Omega noted that
the rational for this interpretation was

never sold in the United States, the

court held the application of the first
sale doctrine inapplicable, and thus that
the decision in Quality King had not
changed the rule.
The Ninth Circuit wrestled with

Endnotes

1. Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L'anza
Research International, Inc., 523 u.s.

135 (1998).
2. BMG Music v. Perez, 952 F.2d 318

(9,h Cir. 1991).

twofold: First, "a contrary interpreta-

the question whether the reasoning

3. Denbicare US.A. Inc. v. Toys ''R'' Us,

tion would impermissibly extend the
Copyright Act extraterritorially, [and]
second, the application of§ 109(a) after
foreign sales would 'render § 602 virtually meaningless''' ... because importa-

of Quality King, that applied § 109 to
foreign-made goods, would violate the

The author was counsel to the defendant Toys "R" Us, Inc. in this case.

presumption against the extraterrito-

least one lawful foreign sale that will

rial application of U.S. law, and should
change the result, and concluded that
it did not. The court noted that in the
Quality King decision's only direct lan-

have exhausted the distribution right on

guage on the issue was Judge Ginsburg's

which § 602 is premised.
Another prior case, Denbicare USA.
Inc. v. Toys (~» Us) Inc.,3 involved copies made in Hong Kong and voluntarily
sold in the United States by the US
Copyright owner, applied the first sale

concurring opinion, citing a copyright

tion is almost always preceded

by at

exception to infringement, because the

goods imported by third parties into the
United States prior to the defendants

purchase and resale of them, although
foreign made, had been voluntarily sold
within the United States. The U.S. sale
had "exhausted the exclusive rights of
distribution."
With this as a background, the
Ninth Circuit considered the effect of
the Supreme Court's decision in Quality
King, and held that the Quality King

Inc., 84 F.3d 1143 (9,h Cir. 1996).

VIDEO GAME DEPICTION OF
LOS ANGELES STRIP CLUB IS
NOT INFRINGEMENT AND IS
PROTECTED UNDER THE FIRST
AMENDMENT.

treatise for the proposition that "law-

fully made under this title" means
"lawfully made in the United States."
The Court concluded that its general
rule that § 109(a) refers "only to copies
legally made .. .in the United States," is
not clearly irreconcilable with Quality
King, and, therefore, remains binding
precedent. Under this rule, the first sale
doctrine is unavailable as a defense to

ESS Entertainment 2000, Inc. d/
b/a Playpen v. Rock Star Video,
Inc. et al.
F.3d
November 5, 2008
IN THIS INTERESTING CASE

the Ninth

Circuit considers trademark infringement and unfair competition within
the content of a video game.
Rock Star Games, Inc., manufac-

the claims under §§ 106(3) and 602(a)

tures the Grand Theft Auto series of

because there is no genuine dispute

video games, which includes Grant

that Omega manufactured the watches

Theft Auto: San Andreas. The series

bearing the copyrighted Omega Globe

is known for an irreverent and some-

Design in Switzerland.

times crass brand of humor, gratuitous

Critics of the Ninth Circuit deci-

violence and sex, and overall seediness.

sion in Omega have suggested that

The San Andreas game allows a player
to experience a version of West Coast

BMG Music and Denbicare) since
the goods in Quality King had been

applying the first sale doctrine to
copyrighted goods manufactured in
the United States, exported, and then

manufactured inside the United States.

imported into the United States, would

Justice Ginsburg, in her concurring

encourage trademark owners concerned

cities, mimicking the look and feel of
actual Los Angeles neighborhoods. Los

opinion in Quality King specifically recognized that Quality King involved only

about "gray market goods" or "parallel

Santos is populated with virtual liquor

imports," to shift their manufactur-

stores, ammunition dealers, casinos,

domestically manufactured copies and,

ing sources outside the United States.

pawnshops, tattoo parlors, bars, and

as she noted, "the Court did not address

While this may be the result, the decision falls naturally from the law in the
Ninth Circuit, not overruled by Quality
King, and, time will tell whether this

strip clubs.
The artist who designed the video
game visited Los Angeles neighborhoods, taking pictures, including a pic-

cases in which the allegedly infringing

interpretation of the law will cause any

ture of a Los Angeles strip club occu-

imports were manufactured abroad."

shifts in manufacturing outside the

pied by plaintiff ESS Entertainment.
This strip club features females dancing

decision did not overrule such cases
as

the effect of § 109(a) on claims involving unauthorized importation of copies
made abroad. We do not today resolve

Since the Omega watches sold by

United States . •

"gangster" culture, taking place in West
Coast cities, with Los Santos, one of the

Costco were manufactured abroad and
New Matter
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nude, and is named the "Play Pen." ESS
("Play Pen") filed a suit against Rock

plaintiff's mark." Rock Star had "testified the goal in designing the Pig Pen

game had no artistic relevance and that

Star for trade dress infringement and

was ... not to comment on Play Pen per

unfair competition under Section 43 of

se." Since Rock Star did not use the Pig

ing. First ESS observed that the game
was not "about" ESS's Play Pen Club

the Lanham Act, 15 U.s.c. § 1125(a)

Pen logo to describe the Play Pen Strip
Club, the Ninth Circuit noted that the

and trademark infringement and unfair

competition under California law. ESS
complains that Rock Star has used
Play Pen's logo and trade dress in its
video game visual of its "Pig Pen bar,"
and used Play Pen's distinctive logo and

district court correctly held that the
nominative fair use defense did not
apply. The nominative fair use defense

is for a defendant's use of the plaintiff's
trademark to describe the plaintiff or

its use of it was not explicitly mislead-

the way the artwork was about the

Barbie doll in the Mattei case, and secondly that unlike the Barbie case, where
the trademark, Barbie Doll, was a cultural icon, ESS's Play Pen was hardly a
cultural icon.

trade dress without authorization, cre-

its goods or services; this was not the

The Ninth Circuit analyzed the law
in terms of its own case, Matte! v. MeA

ating a likelihood of confusion among

case here. Rock Star wanted only a Los

Records) Inc.,3 another Barbie Doll case

consumers as to whether ESS or its

Angeles genre, seedy neighborhood and

where Mattel had sued a record com-

"Play Pen" bar has endorsed, or is asso-

a strip club, but was not seeking to imi-

pany with a song called "Barbie Girl"

ciated with, the video game.

tate the Play Pen.

which was a commentary about Barbie

argued the affirmative defense that it

defense to an infringement claim under

and the values she supposedly represented. The court in this Matte! case
had applied the First Amendment test
to hold that it protected the record

was making nominative fair use of a

the Lanham Act "to apply to artistic

company, noting that the accused song

visual display of the "Play Pen," and

works

that, in any event, the First Amendment

avoiding consumer confusion outweighs

protected it against liability. It also
argued that its use of ESS's intellectual property did not infringe, since

the public interest in free expression."

was about the Barbie doll.
ESS agreed that in the Mattei case
the only indication that Mattel might

The Court cited its decision in Matte!

be associated with the song was the

Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods.,2 where

its video game usage did not create any

an artist was permitted to use Mattel's

likelihood of confusion.
While rejecting the defense of nomi-

Barbie Dolls in his artwork.

native fair use, the district court grant-

Amendment defense, two findings are

use of "Barbie" in the title. The Ninth
Circuit noted that ESS's objections,
though factually accurate, missed the
point of the rule. Under the Barbie song
case and others that followed it "only

ed summary judgment based on the

necessary: First, an artistic work's use

the use of a trademark with 'no artistic

In the Los Angeles district court

Rock Star's second defense was the

Rock Star moved for and was granted

First Amendment. As the court noted,

summary judgment on all claims. It

the First Amendment is appropriate as a

only where

the public interest in

In order for there to be a First

First Amendment defense, and found

of a trademark that otherwise would

relevance to the underlying work what-

it unnecessary to address the trademark

violate the Lanham Act is not action-

soever' does not merit First Amendment

infringement claims directly.

able "unless the [use of the mark] has

protection." In other words, as the court

no artistic relevance to the underlying

noted, "the level of relevance merely

work whatsoever, or, if it has some

must be above zero." The court noted

artistic relevance, unless [it] explicitly

that in this case, while it was true that

scenario when the accused infringer

misleads as to the source or the content

the game was not about the Play Pen

uses "the trade mark term to describe
not its own product but the plaintiff's."l

of the work." The court noted initially
that although this test traditionally

the way the Barbie Girl song was about
the Barbie doll, given the low threshold

The doctrine protects those who delib-

applies to uses of a trademark in the

of relevance the game must surmount,

erately use another's trademark or trade

title of an artistic work, it found no

this fact would hardly be dispositive.

dress for the purposes of comparison,

principled reason why it ought not to

Secondly the court also noted it was

criticism or point of reference. The

apply equally to the use of a trademark
in the body of a work.
Although ESS acknowledged that

also true that the Play Pen bar had "little

Ninth Circuit looked at the video game
and its purpose, and concluded that the
use of the video game was not nomina-

the game was artistic and that the test

tive fair use. First, the video game's use

applied, it argued both that the incorporation of the Pig Pen bar into the

This Is Not Nominative Fair Use
Nominative Fair Use is the fair use

of "Pig Pen" was not "identical to the
New Matter
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cultural significance, but that the same

could be said about most of the individual establishments in East L.A.; its
distinctiveness lies in its" look and feel,"
not in particular destinations. As the

court noted, that neighborhood with all
its seedy characteristics was relevant to
Rock Star's artistic goal, which was to

develop a cartoon-style parody of East
Los Angeles. The court found that possibly the only way, or at least certainly
a reasonable way, to do this would be
to recreate a critical mass of the busi-

nesses and buildings there, as the game

could reasonably have believed that ESS
produced the video or, that Rock Star
operated a strip club. The court found
it farfetched that someone playing the
game would think that ESS had providclub knowledge it possesses to the pro-

duction of the game. After all this strip
club was only a backdrop within the
game and whatever one can do at the

does indeed have at least "some artistic

story of the game. The court concluded

relevance," so as to support the applica-

the reasonable consumer would not

Pig Pen, the video game seemed quite
incidental to the court to the overall

Thus the First Amendment applied
as a defense to infringement and unfair

was not well known to the public, also

competition, since the video game was
est in avoiding customer confusion did

produces a technologically sophisticated
video game like San Andreas.
One has to believe that Judge

not outweigh the public interest in

O'Scannlain must have enjoyed writing

free expression. The use of the image

this opinion. As he noted "undeterred,

had artistic relevance to the underlying

ESS also argues that because players are

work, and did not explicitly mislead

free to ignore the storyline and within

customers as to the source or content

the video game spend as much time

of the work.

as they want at the Pig Pen, the Pig

As to confusion, the Ninth Circuit

Pen can be considered to be a signifi-

noted that while the purpose of the

cant part of the game, thus leading to

Lanham Act was to avoid confusion

confusion." The court found this argu-

in the marketplace, the relevant ques-

ment to be farfetched, but it certainly

tion here was whether the game would

allows one to raise such issues within

confuse its players into thinking that

a virtual world of a video game. Judge

the Play Pen was somehow behind the

0' Scannlain answered this argument

Pig Pen, or that it sponsors or authorizes

with the analogy to Dodger Stadium.
As he said "fans can spend all nine
innings of a baseball game at the hotdog stand; that hardly makes Dodger
Stadium a butcher's shop." As he noted

the video games. In other words the
mere use of a trademark alone would
not suffice to make such use explicitly

misleading.
The court analyzed the two bars

and uses, and found that while the
San Andreas Game, and the Play Pen
strip club both "offer a form of low

Endnotes

1. See Playboy Enterprises., Inc. v. Welles,
279 F.3d 796 (9th Cir. 2002).
2. Matte! Inc. v. Walking Mountain
Prods.,353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003).
3. Mattei v. MeA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d
894 (9th Cir. 2002).
4.

Author's note: Some youthful voyeurs might disagree!

think that a company that owns one

strip club in East Los Angeles, which

an artistic work, where the public inter-

Neil A. Smith is a partner in the
Intellectual Property Practice Group of the
San Francisco and San Jose offices of
Ropers Majeski Kohn & Bentley

ed any expertise support or unique strip

did. As such the court concluded that
to include a strip club that is similar in
"look and feel" to the Play Pen strip club

tion of the First Amendment here.

© 2008 Neil Smith.

"the chance to attend a virtual strip
club is unambiguously not the main

selling point of the game.'''
The virtual world creates another

brow entertainment," that besides this

most interesting legal issue, but this

general similarity, they have nothing in

court seems to sanction the background

common. Video games and strip clubs

use of actual locations, buildings and

do not as the court noted "go together

businesses within simulated video and

like a horse and carriage or, perish the

virtual worlds, at least where such use

thought, love and marriage." Nothing
would indicate that the buying public

is either incidental or not explicitly

misleading . •
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OPINION
CALLAHAN, Circuit Judge:
Defendants-Appellants California Governor Schwarzenegger and California Attorney General Brown (the “State”)
appeal the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor
of Plaintiffs-Appellees Video Software Dealers Association
and Entertainment Software Association (“Plaintiffs”), and
the denial of the State’s cross-motion for summary judgment.1
Plaintiffs filed suit for declaratory relief seeking to invalidate
newly-enacted California Civil Code sections 1746-1746.5
(the “Act”), which impose restrictions and a labeling requirement on the sale or rental of “violent video games” to minors,

1

Plaintiffs are associations of companies that create, publish, distribute,
sell and/or rent video games, including games that would be potentially
regulated under the California statutory scheme at issue.
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on the grounds that the Act violates rights guaranteed by the
First and Fourteenth Amendments.2
We hold that the Act, as a presumptively invalid contentbased restriction on speech, is subject to strict scrutiny and
not the “variable obscenity” standard from Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). Applying strict scrutiny, we hold
that the Act violates rights protected by the First Amendment
because the State has not demonstrated a compelling interest,
has not tailored the restriction to its alleged compelling interest, and there exist less-restrictive means that would further
the State’s expressed interests. Additionally, we hold that the
Act’s labeling requirement is unconstitutionally compelled
speech under the First Amendment because it does not require
the disclosure of purely factual information; but compels the
carrying of the State’s controversial opinion. Accordingly, we
affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to
Plaintiffs and its denial of the State’s cross-motion. Because
we affirm the district court on these grounds, we do not reach
two of Plaintiffs’ challenges to the Act: first, that the language
of the Act is unconstitutionally vague, and, second, that the
Act violates Plaintiffs’ rights under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
I.
A.
On October 7, 2005, Governor Schwarzenegger signed into
law Assembly Bill 1179 (“AB 1179”), codified at Civil Code
§§ 1746-1746.5.3 The Act states that “[a] person may not sell
or rent a video game that has been labeled as a violent video
2

All references to “Civil Code” or “section 1746” refer to the California
Civil Code unless otherwise indicated.
3
During the legislative session, A.B. 1179 had been “gutted” and
amended; the language in Assembly Bill 450 (“A.B. 450”) replaced the
original language in A.B. 1179.
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game to a minor.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1746.1(a).4 Violators are
subject to a civil penalty of up to $1,000. Id. at § 1746.3.
Central to this appeal, the Act defines a “violent video
game” as follows:
(d)(1) “Violent video game” means a video game in
which the range of options available to a player
includes killing, maiming, dismembering, or sexually assaulting an image of a human being, if those
acts are depicted in the game in a manner that does
either of the following:
(A)

Comes within all of the following descriptions:
(i) A reasonable person, considering the
game as a whole, would find appeals to a
deviant or morbid interest of minors.
(ii) It is patently offensive to prevailing
standards in the community as to what is
suitable for minors.
(iii) It causes the game, as a whole, to lack
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for minors.

(B) Enables the player to virtually inflict serious
injury upon images of human beings or characters
with substantially human characteristics in a manner
which is especially heinous, cruel, or depraved in
4

The parties dispute whether the Act bans purchases or rentals by
minors who are accompanied by their parents. The Act does not speak to
whether there is an exception for sales to minors accompanied by a parent;
it states only that it does not apply “if the violent video game is sold or
rented to a minor by the minor’s parent, grandparent, aunt, uncle, or legal
guardian.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1746.1(c).
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that it involves torture or serious physical abuse to
the victim.
Id. at § 1746(d)(1).5 Borrowing language from federal death
penalty jury instructions, the Act also defines the terms
“cruel,” “depraved,” “heinous,” and “serious physical abuse,”6
and states that “[p]ertinent factors in determining whether a
5

The State concedes on appeal, consistent with the district court’s conclusion, that the alternate definition of “violent video game” in section
1746(d)(1)(B) is unconstitutional because it “does not provide an exception for material that might have some redeeming value to minors . . . .”
The State’s contention that this section of the Act is severable based on
the severability clause contained in California Civil Code § 1746.5 is subsequently addressed.
6
Section 1746(d)(2) includes the following definitions:
(A) “Cruel” means that the player intends to virtually inflict a
high degree of pain by torture or serious physical abuse of the
victim in addition to killing the victim.
(B) “Depraved” means that the player relishes the virtual killing
or shows indifference to the suffering of the victim, as evidenced
by torture or serious physical abuse of the victim.
(C) “Heinous” means shockingly atrocious. For the killing
depicted in a video game to be heinous, it must involve additional
acts of torture or serious physical abuse of the victim as set apart
from other killings.
(D) “Serious physical abuse” means a significant or considerable amount of injury or damage to the victim’s body which
involves a substantial risk of death, unconsciousness, extreme
physical pain, substantial disfigurement, or substantial impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty. Serious physical abuse, unlike torture, does not require that
the victim be conscious of the abuse at the time it is inflicted.
However, the player must specifically intend the abuse apart from
the killing.
(E) “Torture” includes mental as well as physical abuse of the
victim. In either case, the virtual victim must be conscious of the
abuse at the time it is inflicted; and the player must specifically
intend to virtually inflict severe mental or physical pain or suffering upon the victim, apart from killing the victim.

VIDEO SOFTWARE v. SCHWARZENEGGER

1945

killing depicted in a video game is especially heinous, cruel,
or depraved include infliction of gratuitous violence upon the
victim beyond that necessary to commit the killing, needless
mutilation of the victim’s body, and helplessness of the victim.”7
Id. at § 1746(d)(2)-(3).
The Act also imposes a labeling requirement. It requires
that each “violent video game” imported into or distributed in
California must “be labeled with a solid white ‘18’ outlined
in black,” which shall appear on the front face of the game’s
package and be “no less than 2 inches by 2 inches” in size.
Id. at § 1746.2.
A.B. 1179 states that the State of California has two compelling interests that support the Act: (1) “preventing violent,
aggressive, and antisocial behavior”; and (2) “preventing psychological or neurological harm to minors who play violent
video games.” A.B. 1179 also “finds and declares” that:
(a) Exposing minors to depictions of violence in
video games, including sexual and heinous violence,
makes those minors more likely to experience feelings of aggression, to experience a reduction of
activity in the frontal lobes of the brain, and to
exhibit violent antisocial or aggressive behavior.
(b) Even minors who do not commit acts of violence suffer psychological harm from prolonged
exposure to violent video games.
The State included in the excerpts of record several hundred pages of material on which the Legislature purportedly
relied in passing the Act. While many of the materials are
social science studies on the asserted impact of violent video
7

Legislative materials in the record indicate that the Legislature used
these terms in the Act because they survived claims of unconstitutional
vagueness in United States v. Jones, 132 F.3d 232 (5th Cir. 1998).
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games on children, other documents are varied and include
legal analyses, general background papers, position papers,
etc. Dr. Craig Anderson, whose work is central to the State’s
arguments in this case, is listed as an author of roughly half
of the works included in the bibliography.
B.
The content of the video games potentially affected by the
Act is diverse. Some of the games to which the Act might
apply are unquestionably violent by everyday standards, digitally depicting what most people would agree amounts to
murder, torture, or mutilation. For example, the State submitted a videotape that contains several vignettes from the games
Grand Theft Auto: Vice City, Postal 2, and Duke Nukem 3D,
which demonstrate the myriad ways in which characters can
kill or injure victims or adversaries.8 The record also contains
descriptions of several games, some of which are based on
popular novels or motion pictures, which are potentially covered by the Act. Many of these games have extensive plot
lines that involve or parallel historical events, mirror common
fictional plots, or place the player in a position to evaluate and
make moral choices.
The video game industry has in place a voluntary rating
system to provide consumers and retailers information about
video game content. The Entertainment Software Rating
Board (“ESRB”), an independent, self-regulated body established by the Entertainment Software Association, rates the
content of video games that are voluntarily submitted. ESRB
assigns each game one of six age-specific ratings, ranging
from “Early Childhood” to “Adults Only.”9 It also assigns to
8

We note that the State’s videotape contains heavily edited selections of
the violence that can be meted out, but does not include any context or
possible storyline within which the violence occurs.
9
The age ratings include “EC” (Early Childhood), “E” (Everyone),
“E10+” (Everyone Ten and Older), “T” (Teen [13+]), “M” (Mature
[17+]), and “AO” (Adults Only [18+]).
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each game one of roughly thirty content descriptors, which
include “Animated Blood,” “Blood and Gore,” “Cartoon Violence,” “Crude Humor,” “Fantasy Violence,” “Intense Violence,” “Language,” “Suggestive Themes,” and “Sexual
Violence.”
C.
On October 17, 2005, before the Act took effect, Plaintiffs
filed suit against the Governor, the Attorney General, and
three city and county defendants, all in their official capacities, for declaratory relief against the Act on the grounds that
it violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. Plaintiffs argued that the Act unconstitutionally
restricted freedom of expression on its face based on content
regulation and the labeling requirement, was unconstitutionally vague, and violated equal protection.
The district court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 401 F. Supp. 2d 1034 (N.D. Cal. 2005).
Subsequently, the parties filed cross-motions for summary
judgment. The district court granted Plaintiffs’ motion and
denied the State’s cross-motion. See Video Software Dealers
Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, No. C-05-04188, slip op. (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 6, 2007). The district court’s summary judgment order
invalidated the Act under strict scrutiny, and did not reach
Plaintiffs’ claims regarding vagueness, equal protection, or
the Act’s labeling requirement. The district court permanently
enjoined enforcement of the Act. The State timely appealed.
II.
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo and must
“determine, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party, whether there are any genuine issues
of material fact and whether the district court correctly
applied substantive law.” Ballen v. City of Redmond, 466 F.3d
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736, 741 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). We draw all reasonable inferences supported
by the evidence in the nonmoving party’s favor. Id. We “may
affirm summary judgment on any ground supported by the
record.” Doran v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 524 F.3d 1034, 1039 n.3
(9th Cir. 2008).
III.
[1] We first address Plaintiffs’ argument that the entire Act
should be invalidated based on the State’s concession on
appeal that the alternate definition of “violent video game”
found in section 1746(d)(1)(B) is unconstitutionally broad.
The State counters that the Act is saved by the severability
clause in Civil Code § 1746.5, which states: “The provisions
of this title are severable. If any provision of this title or its
application is held to be invalid, that invalidity shall not affect
other provisions or applications that can be given effect without the invalid provision or application.” We hold that the Act
is not wholly invalid as a result of the State’s concession.
[2] We look to state law to determine the effect of the severability clause. Qwest Commc’ns Inc. v. City of Berkeley,
433 F.3d 1253, 1259 (9th Cir. 2006), overruled on other
grounds, Sprint Telephony PCS, L.P. v. County of San Diego,
543 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). Under California law,
there is a general presumption in favor a statute’s constitutionality. Ex parte Blaney, 184 P.2d 892, 900 (Cal. 1947)
(“[T]he general presumption of constitutionality, fortified by
the express statement of a severability clause, normally calls
for sustaining any valid portion of statute unconstitutional in
part.”). An invalid portion of a statute
can be severed if, and only if, it is “grammatically,
functionally and volitionally separable.” It is “grammatically” separable if it is “distinct” and “separate”
and, hence, “can be removed as a whole without
affecting the wording of any” of the measure’s
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“other provisions.” It is “functionally” separable if it
is not necessary to the measure’s operation and purpose. And it is “volitionally” separable if it was not
of critical importance to the measure’s enactment.
Hotel Employees & Rest. Employees Int’l Union v. Davis, 981
P.2d 990, 1009 (Cal. 1999) (citations omitted); see also Jevne
v. Superior Court, 111 P.3d 954, 971 (Cal. 2005).
[3] Section 1746(d)(1)(B) is grammatically and functionally separable because, as an alternate definition of “violent
video game,” it can be removed from the Act without affecting the wording or function of the Act’s other provisions.
Plaintiffs contend, however, that such a deletion does not
account for the phrase “does either of the following” in section 1746(d)(1), which is the lead-in language to the alternate
definitions of “violent video game,” and that retaining this
phrase results in a “conundrum and grammatical error.” Plaintiffs’ concerns are accounted for by the simultaneous deletion
of the phrase “does either of the following.” Although some
California cases speak in general terms of separability “as a
whole,” see, e.g., Jevne, 111 P.3d at 972, the California
Supreme Court has also evaluated grammatical and functional
separability with respect to whether the valid and invalid portions of a statute or initiative can be “separated by paragraph,
sentence, clause, phrase, or even single words.” Santa Barbara Sch. Dist. v. Superior Court of Santa Barbara County,
530 P.2d 605, 617 (Cal. 1975); see also Ex parte Blaney, 184
P.2d at 900; accord Schweitzer v. Westminster Invs., 69 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 472, 485 (Ct. App. 2007). Here, the phrase “does
either of the following” can be cleanly stricken without doing
violence to the rest of the Act or impermissibly reading into
the statute any exceptions or qualifications. See Fort v. Civ.
Serv. Comm’n of Alameda County, 392 P.2d 385, 390 (Cal.
1964).10
10

Although not argued by the parties, we note that deleting Civil Code
§ 1746(d)(1)(B) also appears to require the deletion of sections 1746(d)(2)
and (d)(3)—which define when a violent act is “cruel,” “depraved,” or
“heinous,” or involves “serious physical abuse” or “torture”—because
these sections only relate to or explain section 1746(d)(1)(B).
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[4] Sections 1746(d)(1)(B), (d)(2), and (d)(3) are also volitionally separable. We must ask whether the inclusion of these
sections was of critical importance to passage of the Act and
whether the Act “would have been adopted by the legislative
body had [it] foreseen the partial invalidation of the statute.”
Sonoma County Org. of Pub. Employees v. County of
Sonoma, 591 P.2d 1, 14 (Cal. 1979) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Evidence in the record indicates that
the Legislature included sections 1746(d)(1)(B), (d)(2) and
(d)(3) in the Act with the express goal of avoiding the constitutional pitfalls identified in Video Software Dealers Association v. Maleng, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1180 (W.D. Wash. 2004). An
Assembly Judiciary Committee Mandatory Information
Worksheet to A.B. 450 and a Research Summary to A.B. 450
both indicate that these detailed definition sections were
included in the Act for the purpose of avoiding the result in
Maleng, where a Washington district court struck down a
2003 state statute, in part, because it was not narrowly tailored. Further, the Assembly Third Reading to A.B. 450 also
discusses the tailoring issues in Maleng, and notes that the
Act “regulates the sale of only those games that contain the
most heinous, cruel or depraved acts of violence.” Nonetheless, the record does not persuade us that sections
1746(d)(1)(B), (d)(2) and (d)(3) were “critical” to the passage
of the Act. The fact that the Legislature included an alternate
definition for “violent video game” designed to help the Act
withstand a constitutional challenge does not necessarily indicate that it would not have passed the Act but for the inclusion
of these sections. Accordingly, in light of California’s presumption in favor of retaining constitutional parts of statutes,
we conclude that the Act is not wholly invalid as a result of
the State’s concession.
IV.
[5] Our next task is to determine what level of scrutiny to
apply in reviewing the Act’s prohibitions. Existing case law
indicates that minors are entitled to a significant measure of
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First Amendment protections, that content-based regulations
are presumptively invalid and subject to strict scrutiny, and
that if less restrictive means for achieving a state’s compelling
interest are available, they must be used. The State’s argument on appeal, that we should not apply strict scrutiny and
instead should apply a “variable obscenity” standard from
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), raises a question
of first impression in this circuit.
[6] The Supreme Court has stated that “minors are entitled
to a significant measure of First Amendment protection, and
only in relatively narrow and well-defined circumstances may
government bar public dissemination of protected materials to
them.” Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 21213 (1975) (citations omitted). The State does not contest that
video games are a form of expression protected by the First
Amendment.11 See Interactive Digital Software Ass’n v. St.
Louis, 329 F.3d 954, 956-58 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that “violent” video games are a protected form of speech); Maleng,
325 F. Supp. 2d at 1184-85 (same). It is also undisputed that
the Act seeks to restrict expression in video games based on
its content. See Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Sheriff Dep’t, 533 F.3d 780, 787 (9th Cir. 2008)
(“[A] law is content-based if either the main purpose in enacting it was to suppress or exalt speech of a certain content, or
it differentiates based on the content of speech on its face.”
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Interactive
Digital Software Ass’n, 329 F.3d at 958 (holding that an ordinance that applied to graphically violent video games was a
content-based restriction).
11

The Supreme Court has not specifically commented on whether video
games contain expressive content protected under the First Amendment;
however, story-laden video games of the type potentially covered under
the Act are similar to movies, which the Court has long held are protected
expression notwithstanding their ability to entertain as well as inform. See,
e.g., Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501-02 (1952).
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“Content-based regulations are presumptively invalid.”
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992). We ordinarily review content-based restrictions on protected expression under strict scrutiny, and thus, to survive, the Act “must
be narrowly tailored to promote a compelling Government
interest.” United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529
U.S. 803, 813 (2000). “If a less restrictive alternative would
serve the Government’s purpose, the legislature must use that
alternative.” Id.; see also Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v.
FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (“The Government may . . .
regulate the content of constitutionally protected speech in
order to promote a compelling interest if it chooses the least
restrictive means to further the articulated interest.”); Reno v.
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 876-77 (1997) (finding relevant the fact
that a reasonably effective method by which parents could
prevent children from accessing internet material which parents believed to be inappropriate “will soon be widely available”).
The State, however, urges us to depart from this framework
because the Act concerns minors. It argues that we should
analyze the Act’s restrictions under what has been called the
“variable obscenity” or “obscenity as to minors” standard first
mentioned in Ginsberg, 390 U.S. 629. In essence, the State
argues that the Court’s reasoning in Ginsberg that a state
could prohibit the sale of sexually-explicit material to minors
that it could not ban from distribution to adults should be
extended to materials containing violence. This presents an
invitation to re-consider the boundaries of the legal concept of
“obscenity” under the First Amendment.
[7] In Ginsberg, the Court held that New York State could
prohibit the sale of sexually-explicit material to minors that
was defined by statute as obscene because of its appeal to
minors. Id. at 643, 646. Therefore, the state could prohibit the
sale of “girlie magazines” to minors regardless of the fact that
the material was not considered obscene for adults. Id. at 643.
The Court stated that “[t]o sustain the power to exclude mate-
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rial defined as obscenity by [the statute] requires only that we
be able to say that it was not irrational for the legislature to
find that exposure to material condemned by the statute is
harmful to minors.”12 Id. at 641. The Court offered two justifications for applying this rational basis standard: (1) that “constitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the
parents’ claim to authority in their own household to direct
the rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our
society”; and (2) the state’s “independent interest in the wellbeing of its youth.” Id. at 639-40.
The State suggests that the justifications underlying Ginsberg should apply to the regulation of violent content as well
as sexually explicit material. The assertion, however, fails
when we consider the category of material to which the Ginsberg decision applies and the First Amendment principles in
which that decision was rooted.
[8] Ginsberg is specifically rooted in the Court’s First
Amendment obscenity jurisprudence, which relates to nonprotected sex-based expression—not violent content, which is
presumably protected by the First Amendment. See 390 U.S.
at 640. Ginsberg explicitly states that the New York statute
under review “simply adjusts the definition of obscenity to
social realities by permitting the appeal of this type of material to be assessed in term of the sexual interests of such
minors.” Id. at 638 (citation, internal quotation marks, and
alterations omitted). The definition of obscenity that Ginsberg
adjusted was the Court’s obscenity test announced in Roth v.
United States, which dealt with obscene materials defined
with reference to sex. 354 U.S. 476, 485-87 (1957) (discuss12

The statute in Ginsberg used the defined term “harmful to minors,”
which prohibited access by minors when it: “(i) predominantly appeals to
the prurient, shameful or morbid interest of minors, and [¶] (ii) is patently
offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community as a whole with
respect to what is suitable material for minors, and [¶] (iii) is utterly without redeeming social importance for minors.” Id. at 646.
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ing the nature of obscenity at length and stating, among other
things, that “[o]bscene material is material which deals with
sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest.”). The Ginsberg Court applied a rational basis test to the statute at issue
because it placed the magazines at issue within a sub-category
of obscenity—obscenity as to minors—that had been determined to be not protected by the First Amendment, and it did
not create an entirely new category of expression excepted
from First Amendment protection. The State, in essence, asks
us to create a new category of non-protected material based
on its depiction of violence.
The Supreme Court has carefully limited obscenity to sexual content. Although the Court has wrestled with the precise
formulation of the legal test by which it classifies obscene
material, it has consistently addressed obscenity with reference to sex-based material. Such was the case in Roth and
Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966), which modified Roth. And though it post-dates Ginsberg, the Court in
Miller v. California expressly cabined the First Amendment
concept of obscenity in terms of sexual material. 413 U.S. 15,
24 (1973) (“[W]e now confine the permissible scope of such
regulation to works which depict or describe sexual conduct.”)
Circuit courts have resisted attempts to broaden obscenity
to cover violent material as well as sexually-explicit material.
In American Amusement Machine Association v. Kendrick,
which involved a video game restriction that mixed the regulation of sexual and violent material, the Seventh Circuit discussed why “[v]iolence and obscenity are distinct categories
of objectionable depiction,” explaining that obscenity is concerned with “offensiveness,” whereas ordinances like the one
at issue in Kendrick (and here) are concerned with conduct or
harm. 244 F.3d 572, 574-75 (7th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534
U.S. 994 (2001).13 In Video Software Dealers Association v.
13

Citing one law review article, the State also urges us to redefine the
First Amendment meaning of “obscenity”—which involves material
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Webster, the Eighth Circuit held that videos “that contain[ ]
violence but not depictions or descriptions of sexual conduct
cannot be obscene.” 968 F.2d 684, 688 (8th Cir. 1992)
(“Obscenity . . . encompasses only expression that ‘depict[s]
or describe[s] sexual conduct’ ” (citing Miller, 413 U.S. at
24)). Likewise, in Eclipse Enterprises, Inc. v. Gullota, the
Second Circuit declined to place trading cards which depicted
heinous crime that was allegedly harmful to minors in the category of unprotected obscenity. 134 F.3d 63, 66-68 (2d Cir.
1997). Further, in James v. Meow Media, Inc., the Sixth Circuit, in discussing excessively violent movies and video game
material, “decline[d] to extend [its] obscenity jurisprudence to
violent, instead of sexually explicit, material.” 300 F.3d 683,
698 (6th Cir. 2002).
Finally, we note that the Ginsberg Court suggested its
intent to place a substantive limit on its holding. It stated:
We have no occasion in this case to consider the
impact of the guarantees of freedom of expression
upon the totality of the relationship of the minor and
the State. It is enough for the purposes of this case
that we inquire whether it was constitutionally
impermissible for New York . . . to accord minors
under 17 a more restricted right than that assured to
adults to judge and determine for themselves what
sex material they may read or see.
related to sex—by substituting an ordinary definition of obscenity based
on its Latin root. In Maleng, Judge Lasnik rejected the same argument.
325 F. Supp. 2d at 1185. He explained that the phrase “obscene material”
was not inherently limited to sexually explicit material in the ordinary
sense, and that the Latin root “obscaenus” literally means “filth.” Id.
Nonetheless, he held, relying on Miller, 413 U.S. 15, that “when used in
the context of the First Amendment, the word ‘obscenity’ means material
that deals with sex.” Id. This reasoning, dismissing the linguistic argument, applies equally to the State’s argument here.
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Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 636-37 (citation omitted). Though not
the clearest of disclaimers, this language telegraphs that the
Court’s concern in Ginsberg was with the relationship
between the state and minors with respect to a certain subject
matter—“sex material” as it relates to the interests of minors.
[9] In light of our reading of Ginsberg and the cases from
our sister circuits, we decline the State’s invitation to apply
the Ginsberg rationale to materials depicting violence, and
hold that strict scrutiny remains the applicable review standard.14
Our decision is consistent with the decisions of several other
courts that have addressed and rejected the argument that the
Ginsberg standard be extended from the field of sex-based
content to violence in video games. See Interactive Digital
Software Ass’n, 329 F.3d at 959; Kendrick, 244 F.3d at 57678; Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Granholm, 426 F. Supp. 2d 646,
652 (E.D. Mich. 2006); Maleng, 325 F. Supp. 2d at 1185-86.
At oral argument, the State confirmed that it is asking us to
boldly go where no court has gone before. We decline the
State’s entreaty to extend the reach of Ginsberg and thereby
redefine the concept of obscenity under the First Amendment.
V.
[10] Accordingly, we review the Act’s content-based prohibitions under strict scrutiny. As noted above, “[c]ontent-based
regulations are presumptively invalid,” R.A.V., 505 U.S. at
382, and to survive the Act “must be narrowly tailored to promote a compelling Government interest.” Playboy Entm’t
Group, Inc., 529 U.S. at 813. Further, “[i]f a less restrictive
alternative would serve the Government’s purpose, the legislature must use that alternative.” Id.
14

We also reject the State’s more general request that we equate violent
content with unprotected “obscenity.” As the discussion above indicates,
the Court’s obscenity jurisprudence limits obscene materials to sex-based
materials.
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A.
The Legislature stated that it had two compelling interests
in passing the Act: (1) “preventing violent, aggressive, and
antisocial behavior”; and (2) “preventing psychological or
neurological harm to minors who play violent video games.”
Although there was some early confusion over whether the
State was relying on both of these interests, the State subsequently clarified that “[t]he physical and psychological wellbeing of children is the concern of the Act,” as distinguished
from the interest of protecting third parties from violent
behavior. The State’s focus is on the actual harm to the brain
of the child playing the video game. Therefore, we will not
assess the Legislature’s purported interest in the prevention of
“violent, aggressive, and antisocial behavior.”15
[11] The Supreme Court has recognized that “there is a
compelling interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of minors.” Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc., 492
U.S. at 126; see also Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Swanson, 519
15

Throughout this litigation, the parties have disagreed as to what extent
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam), applies to this
case. The dispute stems from the fact that one of the compelling interests
advanced by the Legislature is the prevention of “violent, aggressive, and
antisocial behavior.” One of the Legislature’s findings was that
“[e]xposing minors to depictions of violence in video games . . . makes
those minors more likely . . . to exhibit violent antisocial or aggressive
behavior.” However, “[t]he government may not prohibit speech because
it increases the chance an unlawful act will be committed ‘at some indefinite future time.’ ” Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 253
(2002) (citation omitted). It “may suppress speech for advocating the use
of force or a violation of law only if ‘such advocacy is directed to inciting
or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce
such action.’ ” Id. (citing Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447). District courts
analyzing the violence prevention rationale have rejected it. See Entertainment Software Association v. Blagojevich, 404 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1073
(N.D. Ill. 2005); Granholm, 426 F. Supp. 2d at 652; Entm’t Software Ass’n
v. Foti, 451 F. Supp. 2d 823, 831 (M.D. La. 2006); Maleng, 325 F. Supp.
2d at 1187 n.3.
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F.3d 768, 771 (8th Cir. 2008); Interactive Digital Software
Ass’n, 329 F.3d at 958; Nunez by Nunez v. City of San Diego,
114 F.3d 935, 944 (9th Cir. 1997); Maleng, 325 F. Supp. 2d
at 1186-87. Notwithstanding this abstract compelling interest,
when the government seeks to restrict speech “[i]t must demonstrate that the recited harms are real, not merely conjectural, and that the regulation will in fact alleviate these harms
in a direct and material way.” Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v.
FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994) (plurality op.); Swanson, 519
F.3d at 771; Interactive Digital Software Ass’n, 329 F.3d at
958-59. Although we must accord deference to the predictive
judgments of the legislature, our “obligation is to assure that,
in formulating its judgments, [the legislature] has drawn reasonable inferences based on substantial evidence.” Turner
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997) (citations
and quotation marks omitted); see also Playboy Entm’t
Group, Inc., 529 U.S. at 822 (“This is not to suggest that a
10,000-page record must be compiled in every case or that the
Government must delay in acting to address a real problem;
but the Government must present more than anecdote and
supposition. The question is whether an actual problem has
been proved . . . .” ).
In evaluating the State’s asserted interests, we must distinguish the State’s interest in protecting minors from actual psychological or neurological harm from the State’s interest in
controlling minors’ thoughts. The latter is not legitimate. The
Supreme Court has warned that the
government cannot constitutionally premise legislation on the desirability of controlling a person’s private thoughts. First Amendment freedoms are most
in danger when the government seeks to control
thought or to justify its laws for that impermissible
end. The right to think is the beginning of freedom,
and speech must be protected from the government
because speech is the beginning of thought.
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Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 253 (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted.) In Kendrick, the Seventh Circuit commented
on a psychological harm rationale in the violent video game
context:
Violence has always been and remains a central
interest of humankind and a recurrent, even obsessive theme of culture both high and low. It engages
the interest of children from an early age, as anyone
familiar with the classic fairy tales collected by
Grimm, Andersen, and Perrault is aware. To shield
children right up to the age of 18 from exposure to
violent descriptions and images would not only be
quixotic, but deforming; it would leave them
unequipped to cope with the world as we know it.
244 F.3d at 579; see also Interactive Digital Software Ass’n,
329 F.3d at 960 (“Speech that is neither obscene as to youths
nor subject to some other legitimate proscription cannot be
suppressed solely to protect the young from ideas or images
that a legislative body thinks unsuitable for them.”) (citation
and quotation marks omitted). Because the government may
not restrict speech in order to control a minor’s thoughts, we
focus on the State’s psychological harm rationale in terms of
some actual effect on minors’ psychological health.
[12] Whether the State’s interest in preventing psychological or neurological harm to minors is legally compelling
depends on the evidence the State proffers of the effect of
video games on minors. Although the Legislature is entitled
to some deference, the courts are required to review whether
the Legislature has drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence presented. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 520 U.S. at
195. Here, the State relies on a number of studies in support
of its argument that there is substantial evidence of a causal
effect between minors playing violent video games and actual
psychological harm.
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The State relies heavily on the work of Dr. Craig Anderson,
pointing to Dr. Anderson’s 2004 updated meta-analysis called
An update on the effects of playing violent video games.16
Craig A. Anderson, An update on the effects of playing violent
video games, 27 J. ADOLESCENCE 113 (2004). This article
states that it “reveals that exposure to violent video games is
significantly linked to increases in aggressive behaviour,
aggressive cognition, aggressive affect, and cardiovascular
arousal, and to decreases in helping behaviour.” Even upon
lay review, however, the disclaimers in this article, alone, significantly undermine the inferences drawn by the State in support of its psychological harm rationale.17 First, Dr. Anderson
remarks on the relative paucity of the video game literature
and concedes that the violent video game literature is not sufficiently large to conduct a detailed meta-analysis of the specific methodological features of other studies, many of which
were themselves flawed. Second, he further states that
“[t]here is not a large enough body of samples . . . for truly
sensitive tests of potential age difference in susceptibility to
violent video game effects,” and jettisons mid-article his
exploration of the effect of age differences (i.e., over-eighteen
versus under-eighteen). It appears that he abandoned the age
aspect of the study, in part, because “there was a hint that the
aggressive behaviour results might be slightly larger for the
18 and over group.” He concludes the meta-analysis with the
admission that there is a “glaring empirical gap” in video
game violence research due to “the lack of longitudinal
studies.”
16

Meta-analysis is “a quantitative method for integrating existing
studies” where “statistical procedures are used to assess the magnitude of
a phenomenon across different studies, independent of the studies’ sample
sizes.” David L. Faigman et al., 2 MOD. SCI. EVIDENCE § 18:13 (2005-06
Ed.).
17
Dr. Anderson’s hearing testimony in the Blagojevich case, which is in
the record, contains his assent to the statements that there is probably an
“infinite” number of stimuli that could cause aggression or aggressive
thoughts in a person (e.g., a picture of a gun), and that his selection of violent video games was “largely a matter of [his] choice.”
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Thus, Dr. Anderson’s research has readily admitted flaws
that undermine its support of the State’s interest in regulating
video games sales and rentals to minors, perhaps most importantly its retreat from the study of the psychological effects of
video games as related to the age of the person studied.18
Although not dispositive of this case, we note that other
courts have either rejected Dr. Anderson’s research or found
it insufficient to establish a causal link between violence in
video games and psychological harm. See Kendrick, 244 F.3d
at 578; Granholm, 426 F. Supp. 2d at 653; Entm’t Software
Ass’n v. Hatch, 443 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1069 & n.1 (D. Minn.
2006); Blagojevich, 404 F. Supp. 2d at 1063.
The State also relies on a study of the effects of video game
violence on adolescents, conducted by Dr. Douglas Gentile,
which studied eighth and ninth graders and concluded that
“[a]dolescents who expose themselves to greater amounts of
video game violence were more hostile” and reported getting
into more arguments and fights and performing poorly in
school. Douglas A. Gentile et al., The effects of violent video
game habits on adolescent hostility, aggressive behaviors,
and school performance, 27 J. ADOLESCENCE 5 (2004). The
extent to which this study supports the State’s position is suspect for similar reasons as Dr. Anderson’s work. First, this
study states that due to its “correlational nature” it could not
directly answer the following question: “Are young adolescents more hostile and aggressive because they expose themselves to media violence, or do previously hostile adolescents
prefer violent media?” Second, this study largely relates to the
player’s violent or aggressive behavior toward others—which,
18

The State also relies on a 2003 study on general media violence by Dr.
Anderson, which contains a three-page section on violent video games and
reflects the conclusions and shortfalls of the 2004 meta-analysis. Craig A.
Anderson et al., The Influence of Media Violence on Youth, 4
PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST 81, 90-93 (2003). For
example, the study states that “[t]here are no published longitudinal surveys specifically focusing on effects of violent video games on aggression.”
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as noted above, is not the interest relied on by the State here
—rather than the psychological or neurological harm to the
player. Moreover, the study glaringly states that “[i]t is important to note . . . that this study is limited by its correlational
nature. Inferences about causal direction should be viewed
with caution” (emphasis added). Finally, Dr. Gentile’s study
suggests that “[a]dditional experimental and longitudinal
research is needed.”
Additionally, the State relies on a study by Dr. Jeanne Funk
for the proposition that video games can lead to desensitization to violence in minors. Jeanne B. Funk et al., Violence
exposure in real-life, video games, television, movies, and the
internet: is there desensitization?, 27 J. ADOLESCENCE 23
(2004). Like the others, this study presents only an attenuated
path between video game violence and desensitization. It specifically disclaims that it is based on correlation principles
and that “causality was not studied.”
Finally, the State relies on a two-page press release from
Indiana University regarding the purported connection
between violent video games and altered brain activity in the
frontal lobe. Press Release, Indiana University School of
Medicine, Aggressive Youths, Violent Video Games Trigger
Unusual Brain Activity (Dec. 2, 2002). The research
described, conducted in part by Dr. Kronenberger, has been
criticized by courts that have reviewed it in depth. See Blagojevich, 404 F. Supp. 2d at 1063-65 (“Dr. Kronenberger conceded that his studies only demonstrate a correlative, not a
causal, relationship between high media violence exposure
and children who experience behavioral disorders [or]
decreased brain activity . . . .” ); Granholm, 426 F. Supp. 2d
at 653 (“Dr. Kronenberger’s research not only fails to provide
concrete evidence that there is a connection between violent
media and aggressive behavior, it also fails to distinguish
between video games and other forms of media.”).
[13] In sum, the evidence presented by the State does not
support the Legislature’s purported interest in preventing psy-
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chological or neurological harm. Nearly all of the research is
based on correlation, not evidence of causation, and most of
the studies suffer from significant, admitted flaws in methodology as they relate to the State’s claimed interest. None of
the research establishes or suggests a causal link between
minors playing violent video games and actual psychological
or neurological harm, and inferences to that effect would not
be reasonable. In fact, some of the studies caution against
inferring causation. Although we do not require the State to
demonstrate a “scientific certainty,” the State must come forward with more than it has. As a result, the State has not met
its burden to demonstrate a compelling interest.
B.
Even if we assume that the State demonstrated a compelling interest in preventing psychological or neurological harm,
the State still has the burden of demonstrating that the Act is
narrowly tailored to further that interest, and that there are no
less restrictive alternatives that would further the Act. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. at 813. We hold that the
State has not demonstrated that less restrictive alternative
means are not available.
Instead of focusing its argument on the possibility of less
restrictive means, the State obscures the analysis by focusing
on the “most effective” means, which it asserts is the one
thousand dollar penalty imposed for each violation. Specifically, the State argues that the ESRB rating system, a voluntary system without the force of law or civil penalty, is not a
less-restrictive alternative means of furthering the Legislature’s purported compelling interest. Acknowledging that the
industry has implemented new enforcement mechanisms, the
State nevertheless argues that the ESRB does not adequately
prevent minors from purchasing M-rated games. The State
also dismisses the notion that parental controls on modern
gaming systems could serve the government’s purposes, arguing that there is no evidence that this technology existed at the
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time the Act was passed. But see Foti, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 833
(suggesting that such controls could be a less-restrictive measure); cf. Reno, 521 U.S. at 876-77 (finding relevant the fact
that a reasonably effective method by which parents could
prevent children from accessing internet material which parents believed to be inappropriate “will soon be widely available”).
Further, the State does not acknowledge the possibility that
an enhanced education campaign about the ESRB rating system directed at retailers and parents would help achieve government interests. See also Playboy, 529 U.S. at 816 (“When
a plausible, less restrictive alternative is offered to a contentbased speech restriction, it is the Government’s obligation to
prove that the alternative will be ineffective to achieve its
goals.”); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484,
507-08 (1996) (plurality op.) (striking down ban on advertising alcohol prices because of less restrictive alternatives, such
as an educational campaign or counter-speech). The State
appears to be singularly focused on the “most effective” way
to further its goal, instead of the “least restrictive means,” and
has not shown why the less-restrictive means would be ineffective.
[14] Even assuming that the State’s interests in enacting the
Act are sufficient, the State has not demonstrated why less
restrictive means would not forward its interests. The Act,
therefore, is not narrowly tailored. Based on the foregoing,
and in light of the presumptive invalidity of content-based
restrictions, we conclude that the Act fails under strict scrutiny review.
VI.
Finally, we evaluate the constitutionality of the Act’s labeling provision, which requires that the front side of the package of a “violent video game” be labeled with a four squareinch label that reads “18.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1746.2. Plaintiffs
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argue that section 1746.2 unconstitutionally forces video
game retailers to carry the State of California’s subjective
opinion, a message with which it disagrees. The State counters that the “labeling provision impacts the purely commercial
aspect regarding retail sales of the covered video games” and,
under the resulting rational basis analysis, the labeling
requirement is rationally related to the State’s “self-evident
purpose of communicating to consumers and store clerks that
the video game cannot be legally purchased by anyone under
18 years of age.”
[15] Generally, “freedom of speech prohibits the government from telling people what they must say.” Rumsfeld v.
Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47,
61 (2006); see also United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533
U.S. 405, 410 (2001); Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 487
U.S. 781, 795 (1988). Commercial speech, however, is generally accorded less protection than other expression. See
United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. at 409. The Court has upheld
compelled commercial speech where the state required inclusion of “purely factual and uncontroversial information” in
advertising. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel,
471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) (upholding state’s requirement that
attorney include in his advertisements a disclosure that clients
may be responsible for litigation costs); see also United States
v. Schiff, 379 F.3d 621, 630-31 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that
the government could compel website operator to post factual
information about potential criminal liability if patrons used
website to evade taxes); Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272
F.3d 104, 113-15 (2d Cir. 2001) (upholding state labeling law
that required manufacturers of mercury-containing products to
disclose on packaging factual and uncontroversial information
about the disposal of mercury-containing products). Compelled disclosures, justified by the need to “dissipate the possibility of consumer confusion or deception,” are permissible
if the “disclosure requirements are reasonably related to the
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State’s interest in preventing deception of customers.”
Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.19
[16] Ordinarily, we would initially decide whether video
game packaging constitutes separable commercial speech or
commercial speech that is “inextricably intertwined” with otherwise fully-protected speech. See Riley, 487 U.S. at 795-96
(stating that “[i]t is not clear that . . . speech is necessarily
commercial whenever it relates to [a] person’s financial motivation for speaking”). That analysis would direct what level
of scrutiny to apply to the labeling requirement. However, we
need not decide that question because the labeling requirement fails even under the factual information and deception
prevention standards set forth in Zauderer.20 Our holding
above, that the Act’s sale and rental prohibition is unconstitutional, negates the State’s argument that the labeling provision
only requires that video game retailers carry “purely factual
and uncontroversial information” in advertising. Zauderer,
471 U.S. at 651. Unless the Act can clearly and legally characterize a video game as “violent” and not subject to First
Amendment protections, the “18” sticker does not convey factual information.
19

Heightened scrutiny may apply, however, if the commercial speech is
“inextricably intertwined” with otherwise fully-protected speech, e.g.,
political speech, charitable solicitations. Riley, 487 U.S. at 796; CalAlmond, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 14 F.3d 429, 436 (9th Cir. 1993).
20
We note that on similar facts, the Seventh Circuit, in Entertainment
Software Association v. Blagojevich, struck down a statute’s requirement
that video game retailers affix a four square-inch sticker reading “18” on
any video game the state defined as “sexually explicit.” 469 F.3d 641,
651-52 (7th Cir. 2006). The court applied strict scrutiny because, in its
view, the label did not concern the disclosure of “purely factual”
information—the label reflected the state’s opinion that the product contained material that the state deemed “sexually explicit” and communicated a “subjective and highly controversial message.” Id. at 652. We do
not adopt the Blagojevich court’s approach here because it is not clear
what authority supported its application of strict scrutiny, and we conclude
that the labeling requirement here is invalid under a less-strict review standard.
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Moreover, the labeling requirement fails Zauderer’s rational relationship test, which asks if the “disclosure requirements are reasonably related to the State’s interest in
preventing deception of customers.” Id. at 651. Our determination that the Act is unconstitutional eliminates the alleged
deception that the State’s labeling requirement would purportedly prevent: the misleading of consumers and retailers by the
ESRB age ratings that already appear on the video games’
packaging. Since the Act is invalid and, as a result, there is
no state-mandated age threshold for the purchase or rental of
video games, there is no chance for deception based on the
possibly conflicting ESRB rating labels. In fact, the State’s
mandated label would arguably now convey a false statement
that certain conduct is illegal when it is not, and the State has
no legitimate reason to force retailers to affix false information on their products. See Hatch, 443 F. Supp. 2d at 1072,
aff’d on other grounds, Swanson, 519 F.3d 768.
VII.
We decline the State’s invitation to apply the variable
obscenity standard from Ginsberg to the Act because we do
not read Ginsberg as reaching beyond the context of restrictions on sexually-explicit materials or as creating an entirely
new category of expression—speech as to minors—excepted
from First Amendment protections. As the Act is a content
based regulation, it is subject to strict scrutiny and is presumptively invalid. Under strict scrutiny, the State has not
produced substantial evidence that supports the Legislature’s
conclusion that violent video games cause psychological or
neurological harm to minors. Even if it did, the Act is not narrowly tailored to prevent that harm and there remain lessrestrictive means of forwarding the State’s purported interests,
such as the improved ESRB rating system, enhanced educational campaigns, and parental controls. Finally, even if the
Act’s labeling requirement affects only commercial speech in
the form of video game packaging, that provision constitutes
impermissibly compelled speech because the compelled label
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would not convey purely factual information. Accordingly,
the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Plaintiffs
and denial of the State’s cross-motion for summary judgment
is AFFIRMED.
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Overview
To rhe creative, technological, managerial, and fi nancial layers o f vid eo game study
add another: the law of intellectual property. Where a player see5 5caml e~ on-sc reen
imeractive gamepby, :md a developer sees original characters, artwork, backgrounds,
storylines, dialogue, music, and sounds brought to life by software game engines and
tools, a h ." '0'er sees an amalgam of patents, c.opyrights, publicity rights, moral rights,
trademarks, and trade secrets. To an inc rea.~ ing eXlent, video game dc\·dop mellt
choices, and uhiman:ly what appears on the player's screen, are shaped by the web of
rights and remedies the legal system colle<:ts under the he::ading of intell ectual property. Intellectual property often is abbreviated IP, and thai designation will be used her.:.
A working definition of intellectual property is the bundle of rights [0 the intan~ ibl e creations and inventions of the hum:m intellecr.
It is useful to think of II' rights as a bundle bec.1use it is possible W 5Uudividc ribhrs
based on factors such as use, duration. exclusivity, tr.msfer:abiiity, and geographic scope.
fr rights have complementary pates: the right to exploi( and the right to conuol
895
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exploitatio n by others. For example, ;} developer's righ r to preVent Others from reprod ucing a game is flmdam ental to the devdoper's right to be co mpensated for the
assignment of the game Ir to a publisher. IP is inrangibl e. IP is not (he book or CD,
bur rather ownership [ights to lhe wl'itten expression contained in the book or audiovisual recording on the CD. A book and C D can be physically possessed ;m d have a
finil e: presence . Th e written expression or audioYISult reco rdi n ~ can be perceived
throug.h an expandi ng array of technology, including the Internet. Consequcndy, they
can have virtually limitless presenCe. Th is combin:l.rion of fac rors. (he in tangible
nature of IP riglllS and [C~ch no l ogi c3 1 adv .. ncc.~ III IP re production and disrribm ion ,
present the great challenge ( 0 (he en force mcn l ofJ P r i gh[~ (oday.
T he al locarion and enforcemel\( of II> fights is governed by na lional and sometimes local laws, government agencies, and international u eaties chat pertain to patents,
copyrights, rrademarks, and trade se ":fe l ~. T he,e law" prilm.rily t he II' law, of the
United States, arc the focus of this chapt er. T he emphasis wili be on video game IP
However, the "3.ppliC3ti on of these laws e:l(tends fa r wider, to all m:lnll er of Kientific,
tech nological, literary, artistic, :lI1d comm ercial crea ,ions, discoveries, and inven tio ns.
T his chapter IS a distillarion of what li re complex and evolving I P laws and principles. It should be nmed rh:lt the description of parllcular laws and principles Illay be
subject to ullstated qualifi cu iom or omissions. IP laws and principles can and do
change and can vary ~ i g ni fican d y among d i lTw~1ll jur i,diniu llS. T h is (.hapu:r due.s not
constitute legal advice, which should be obtained through consulta tion with an attorney in the Context of specific f;l Cts .

Categories of IP Protection
If wi ll be useful to Han with .Ul imroducrlo n to the prin ciples tha t govern the major
fo rms of l P prorection and to consider thei r in terrdat ion .
A p.uenr protects certain novel, useful, and nonobvious invent ions having a urili t:u i3n fun ct io n.
The owner of a Uni ted S ra te.~ p3te m has righ rs superior to a..i l subst:qllenr inventors, hut for a limited term that is curren tly 20 years. Rights 10 an invemio n arc not
protected from use by others unless a patem is obtained from th e Un ited States Patent
and Trademark O ffic e (USPTO). III exchange for the monopoly IP rights gramed to
the patentee during rhe patent term, the patentee must make a full publi c disclosure
of the invention in (he patent. T hi s disclos ure may be fred y exploited by anyone once
the p:ltent exp ires. Patents perme::ne the hardware technology o n wh ich video games
arc pl:1yed. So-called method pa r e n r.~ are med (Q secure a monopoly in particular
forms of gameplay or softw3re fun ctionality, although as b u:r di.~c u ssed such method
p;l(entS are the subject of increasing criticism 3nd judicial limi t3t ion .
Unlike ·the 20-year term of parents, exclusive IP rights to an invention, diKov~ry,
or other co nfidential and commercially val uable information can be ma intained indefinitdy as a trade secret. The owner of a trade secret can preclude others frum disclosing
nonpublic information obtained from fhe owner. However, un like a patent holder,
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the owner of a trJ.de secret cannot SlOp independenr discovery and usc of such informat io n. A palen( docs nOI prolcct ideas, onl}' (he funct io nal embodiment o r implementation of an id('a in a m:w and u~ fu l device o r method. A u-adc seeTe l can be used
ro protect the idea itself from use by others. T he protection accorded u ade secrets is :l
m atter offederal and indi yiduai s t:HC laws, the latter of which 011:('0 arc modeled upon
the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.
A copyright protects creative exp ress ion in any fixed medium such as books, film ,
C Ds, vidcocape, records, and computer hard drives. M wieh patents, copyrights do
not prOtect ideas, only their expression. This limitation applies to so-called sunt! a
'foin.- scock literary devices like plots, incidents, ~ee nes, and characters. In the field of
video games, this concept is captured in the term "genre." It enables such similar
games as Strut Fighter, Virtud Fighta, and Mortn! Kombtlt 10 coexist witham copyright infringmlcm. Copyright protects against only actual copying; therefore, another
person can cl'}im rights to identical expression so lo ng a.~ it was not copied.
Theoretically, two people working without knowledge of each other could paint the
sam e pictu re, write the same software, or take the same phorograph. E.'lch could copyright their creative work. The concept of copyright "expression" does not include
individual words, names, or titl es. Hence , !h e ti de of a vid eo game sllch as Halo cannot be copyrighted. However, it may be trademarked jf it servC.'i to jdentify the source
of th l: gaml: to t:onsumers. T he dur:uio n of:l copyright curre-nlly is the life of the
am hor/ani:>! plu.~ seventy years, o r a fixed period , a.~ discussed below, fo r anonym ous
o r co rpo rate authors. It is no t necessary to register a copyright, altho ugh impon anr
e nfo rcement bc ncfi l.~ are conferred by doing so. Copyright rcgisnmion is the statUlory
respo nsibility of the United States Libr;lry of Congress.
A trade mark or mark is any wo rd, symbol o r device that se rves to identify the
source o r origin of particlllar goods or se rvices. INSO MNIAC G AMES, GRAND
THEFT AUTO and PLAYSTATION are examples offamous wo rd marks ofTnsomniac
Games, [nc., Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc., and So ny Computer Entertainment
Inc., respectively. Sega Corporation's classic "Sonic the Hedgehog" graphic character
design and Nintcndo of America Inc.'s equally fam ous "Mario the Plumber" graphi<:
character design are examples of widely recognized des ign trademarks. The white
and red stylized GAMESTOP lettering is a combined wo rd and dlo:sign mark of
Gamescop, Inc. The nonfunctional trade dress of" a product-the product's "total
image"_ is also capable of serving as a trademark. An example is the case dl:sign of the
Microsoft Xbox 360. Unlike a copyright, a trademark can bl: obtain ed for a word or
ride, as long as rhe word or title signifies the source of thl: product or service. For
example, the words "star wars" and "Harry Pa lter" cannot be copyrighted as th e title
of a single book or film, but they e m serve as a trademark fo r a series ofbooh or films
and fo r m l:fchandise related. to {he book Of film !lute o riginates from one soutce.
Moreover, {he creative content o f the 51llr Wars and !larry PotUr slOries, including the
text o r screenplay and such su1x:omponcnrs as character~, costumes, dialogue, scenes, and
plot, is protcl.:table by copyright. Ownership of;:t tr:tdemark is eslablished by first usc .
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It is not necessary to register a trademark to secure exdusive rights but, as with a copyright, registration confers significanr benefits. The USPTO n:gisters trademarks, as do
the individual states. The federal trademark law is known as the Lanham Act. The
duration of a trademark potenrially is perpetual. It lasts as long as it is in use [0 identify the source of goods or services. A federally registered trademark is renewable every
10 years as long as the: mark continues in use in imerstate commerce.
The foregoing IP categories are by no means mutually exclusive. Take, for example,
a game controller named the \XfIGLI with an unusually sculpted design that incorporates a novel motion sensor. WIGLI serves as a trademark identifYing the controller
creator as the seller. The \XfIGLI crea[Or also may be able to claim copyright protection in the controller's shape as a sculpture, apply for a design patent ro protect the
ornamental features of the controller, and apply for a unlity patent on the motion
sensor invention. Over time, if the public associates the controller's distinctive deSign
with the source of the controller, as the public has come to associate the curved shape
of the Coca-Cola glass bottle with cola originating from Coca-Cob Company, then
the controller's shape could be claimed separately as a trademark This IP overlap is
well illustrated in the context of video games.

The IP Content of Video Games
The typical video game is protected by an umbrella of patents, copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets that may be owned by differellt parties. Because copyright
covers creative expression fIxed ill a tangible medium, it is the most prevalent form of
IP protection in video games. Software in the form of game engines and tools, 5Oftware documentation, artwork, stotyline, backgrounds, characters, costumes,
weapons, dialogue, text, sound effects, and music are among the forms of copyrightable expression found in games. Copyright ownership originates with (he author
or cteatot. This can be the employee who draws the art\vork or an independent contractor who scores the music. Under "work-for-hire" principles later discussed,
employee contributions normally become the property of the employer by operation
of law. Independent contractors generally must assign their fights in a written agreement to the party who commissions rhe work. Copyrights are subject to transfer by
assignment or license. An assignmem conveys all rights to the copyrighted IP. A
license conveys less than all of such rights; for example, the nonexclusive, nontransferable, perpetual right to sel! the copyrighted work throughout North America.
Independent developers typically assign rights to those portions of the game that are
experienced by a player to the publisher that funds development of the game. They
grant an irrevocable and nonexclusive license to the publisher for the software that
enables the game to run. The game may be based on a copyright license, such as when
a film, book, or comic is made into a video game.
Patents may apply to the technology embodied in the hardware on which the
game is played, on the media (diskette, CD, cartridge, bard drive) on which the game
is recorded, and on software that enables the game to perfurm particular functions.
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Hardware patents are owned or licensed by the manufacmrer, who also may be the
publisher, in the case of Sony, Microsoft, and Nintendo, and at timl':s also thl': devdopl':r of the gaml':. Because patl':nts are expensivl': to acquirl': and to enforcl':, thl':)' all':
tardy sought by indl':pendent devdopl':fs.
Video games also providl': a fertile environment for trademarks. The publisher
and devdoper of thl': game, oftl':ll sl':parate parril':s, may each rradl':mark thl':ir businl':ss
naml': as a word mark and may crl':ate a design such as fanciful lettering or a graphic as
a further source of their identification. The tide of rhe game may be the separate subject of trademark protection. If a particular feature of the game also acts as a designation of the source of the game, it may function as a trademark.1u already mentioned,
Sega's adoption of Sonic the Hedgehog as its corporate mascot, Nintl':ndo's similar display of Mario the Plumber. and Sony's de focta use of Crash Bandicoot as its mascot in
connection with the original PlayStation games, have served as widdy recognized
brands of these companies.
Lastly, confidential aspects of the know-how used to program the game, budgets
and financial statements, and thl': terms of the agreements between the devdoper and
its publisher, its employees, and its independent contractors, may be secured from use
by others as trade secrets. Prior to [he release of a much anticipated game to the public, the entire contents of rhe game may be maintained as a trade secret to build interest and thwart simultaneous-rdease knockoffs.
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Instead of legislation, Congress should let the courts
continue to resolve the patent crisis.

Courts and the
Patent System
B Y D AN L. B URK

University of California, Irvine

AND

M ARK A. L EMLEY
Stanford Law School

T

he patent system is in crisis. The consensus in favor of strong patent protection
that has existed since the 1982 creation of
the Federal Circuit (the appeals court that
hears virtually all patent disputes in the
United States) has broken down. Patent
owners — and the Federal Circuit itself —
are beset on all sides by those complaining about the proliferation of bad patents and the abuse of those patents in
court. Critics point to example after example: silly patents
granted by the Patent and Trademark Office (pto), lawsuits
filed by people who invented something decades ago against
companies who do something very different today, patent
claims so confusing that no one can be sure what the patent
covers, and so on.
But the patent system described above — the one in crisis
— is not the only patent system in the United States. There is
another system in which claims are clear, patents are subject
to significant scrutiny, and strong protection is necessary to
allow companies to recover hundreds of millions of dollars in
investment. The prototypical industry that operates in this second patent system is the pharmaceutical industry, but other
industries, including medical devices and chemistry, look
more like this as well.
Talk to lawyers or businesspeople at technology companies
about the patent system and you will quickly get a sense of our
two different patent systems. In the pharmaceutical industry,
there seems to be a strong consensus (at least among innoDan L. Burk is Chancellor’s Professor of Law at the University of California, Irvine.
Mark A. Lemley is the William H. Neukom Professor of Law at Stanford University
and a partner at Durie Tangri LLP.
This article is excerpted from their new book, The Patent Crisis and How the

Courts Can Solve It (University of Chicago Press, 2009).
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vative rather than generic pharmaceutical companies) that
patents are critical to innovation. Their only complaint is that
patents aren’t strong enough. They don’t last long enough to
compensate for delays in the drug approval process, and the
uncertain or probabilistic nature of patent scope and validity leaves them with uncertain protection for their enormous
investment.
Lawyers and executives in the information technology (IT)
industries, by contrast, almost invariably see the patent system as a cost rather than a benefit to innovation. Even IT companies with tens of thousands of patents generally use those
patents only “defensively,” to minimize the amount they
must pay other patent owners to permit them to sell their
products. Ask most of those companies, and in their candid
moments they will tell you that they would be better off
without any patent system, or at least with one that was radically changed and that left them alone to innovate.
I N N O VAT I O N D I F F E R E N C E S

Any doubts that the patent system is perceived by different
industries in fundamentally different ways were dispelled
during the past five years of congressional debate over patent
reform. Different industries calling for reform couldn’t agree
on a single principle of reform. The pharmaceutical and
biotech industries wanted harmonization on first-to-file, the
elimination of the best-mode requirement, and the weakening of rules against inequitable conduct, but those changes
were opposed by the IT industry. The IT industry wanted
reforms to limit damages and injunctive relief in patent
holdup settings and an effective administrative process to
oppose patents, but those reforms were opposed by the biomedical industries.
In the last 20 years, legal and economic scholarship has pro-

Pharmaceutical companies may try hundreds of compounds
before identifying a possible drug, and they may not know for
years whether they have chosen the right one for testing.
Drug companies need some way to get a return on that significant investment.
Another example of an industry where invention requires
significant investment is semiconductors. As microprocessors
have gotten smaller, their design as well as the facilities and
processes used to create them have grown exponentially more
complex. Building a new microprocessor requires not only
painstaking work on circuit design — work that can cost tens
of millions of dollars — but also the design and construction
of an entirely new fabrication process in a new facility. The
need for both highly skilled labor and a dedicated physical
plant makes microprocessor development highly resourceintensive. Ultimately, the design of a new generation of microprocessors takes years of planning and construction and can
cost more than $4 billion.
By contrast, other industries require significantly less investment in research and development. In the software industry,

MORGAN BALLARD

vided valuable evidence about the complex process of innovation and how the patent system affects innovation. Rather
than resolve the debate over how well the patent system works,
however, this evidence has painted a more complex picture.
Different industries vary greatly in how they approach innovation, the cost of innovation, and the importance of innovation to continued growth. One size definitely does not fit all.
This observation is graphically illustrated by examples from
several industries, whose characteristics we sketch here.
First, the cost of research and development varies widely
from industry to industry and from innovation to innovation.
In the pharmaceutical industry, for example, the research
and development, drug design, and testing of a new drug can
take a decade or more and cost, on average, hundreds of millions of dollars. Some — probably most — of this cost is a result
of the labyrinthine regulatory process and the detailed study
that is required to determine that a drug is safe and effective
for humans so the Food and Drug Administration will
approve it. A major additional part of the cost stems from the
uncertainty of the research and development efforts.
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for example, it has long been possible for two programmers
working in a garage to develop a commercial software program.
The cost of writing code has gone up in recent years, particularly for operating systems. Operating systems tend to be
more complex than applications programs because operating
systems must be written to run a variety of computer programs
and control various hardware devices. But it is still possible in
many cases to hire a team of programmers to write a new applications program for less than $1 million. Although debugging
a new program is still a significant undertaking, writing such
a program takes considerably less time than developing a new
drug or producing a microprocessor.
Further, in software and many other industries, particularly
biotechnology and the manufacture of machines and consumer products, much of the innovation process has been
automated in the last 15 years. Although computer-assisted
design and manufacturing tools do not replace the need for
innovative ideas, they make the process of prototyping and
testing those ideas much easier and faster. Similarly, powerful bioinformatics databases and the development of massproduction techniques like polymerase chain reaction have
revolutionized the biotechnology industry, making the identification of gene sequences and the development of related
therapies much cheaper and quicker than they were in preceding decades. The use of automated tools that actually
generate sections of code to help design simple programs such
as websites has made computer programming simpler. The
result of this automation is that industries in which traditional innovation was largely an iterative process of optimizing prototypes today require less research and development
expenditure than those that require either live testing or a new
manufacturing process.
Economic evidence has also shown industry-specific variation in the corporate nature of innovation. The prototypical
innovation contemplated by the patent law is made by an
individual inventor working in his garage after hours. But
innovation in most industries today is generally collaborative
and much of it requires large laboratories. The overwhelming
majority of patents today are granted to large corporations, and
even those granted to individuals and small corporations are
often incubated in large research universities. The role of individual inventors is much greater in some industries, such as
mechanics and software, than in others, such as biotechnology and semiconductors. And not surprisingly, corporate
innovation tends to cost more than innovation by individuals.
D I F F E R E N C E S I N PAT E N T I N G P R A C T I C E

The systematic variation in research and development expenditures across industries naturally affects the need for patent
protection. Industries that must spend more time and money
in research and development generally have a greater need for
patent protection in order to recoup that investment. That
doesn’t mean that the patent system has no place for cheaper inventions; patents may still facilitate market transactions
in new innovations. But certain industries have a stronger
claim than others to need the incentives patents provide.
The effective scope of patents that do issue also varies
20 R EG U L AT I O N S U M M E R 2 0 0 9

tremendously by industry. This variance results from the
relationship between a patent and a product. Much conventional wisdom in the patent system is built on the unstated
assumption of a one-to-one correspondence in which a single patent covers a single product. For example, we speak of
patents covering products: in common parlance, Eli Whitney
patented the cotton gin, Thomas Edison patented the light
bulb, Alexander Graham Bell patented the telephone, and the
Wright brothers patented the airplane. Modern patent law
also assumes such a one-for-one correspondence in its decision to measure damages by the profits lost in the sale of
infringing products.
However, such a correspondence is the exception rather
than the rule in the modern economy. Machines of even
moderate complexity are composed of many different pieces,
and each of those components can itself be the subject of one
or more patents. No inventor could patent a modern car, for
instance. Rather, he would be required to patent a particular
invention — say, intermittent windshield wipers — that is
only one small piece of a much larger product. This correspondence may have been overstated even in the classic inventions mentioned in the last paragraph: the Wright brothers
did not in fact patent an aircraft; their patent actually covered
the use of a vertical rudder and a fixed wing (the “aeroplane”). Edison’s patent was an improvement on an existing
light bulb that claimed a particular class of incandescent filaments. Still, the traditional mechanical nature of invention
was more susceptible to the one patent–one product correspondence than the more complex modern environment.
The strength of this correspondence varies by industry. In
some industries such as chemistry and pharmaceuticals, a single patent normally covers a single product — a new chemical or a new use for that chemical. In industries such as semiconductors, by contrast, new products are so complex that
they can incorporate hundreds and even thousands of different inventions — inventions frequently patented by different companies. A patent covering one of those hundreds of
components will not effectively protect the product; it is useful, if at all, only as a licensing tool. Further, this difference
means that we cannot simply apply the remedy rules from one
industry to patents in another; if damages are calculated correctly, patents in the semiconductor industry will tend to
generate much lower royalty rates than in the single-patent
product industries. Mark Lemley and Carl Shapiro, in a 2007
Texas Law Review paper, offer evidence that courts do not
fully take these differences into account, but they still find
industry-specific variation in royalty rates. Still other industries fall somewhere in between. Products in biotechnology or
software may require the integration of several different
patents, but not hundreds of them. The correspondence
between patents and products obviously affects the significance of patents in protecting research and development.
Industries differ in the importance of continued innovation. Innovation is, in general, socially valuable. In many
industries, especially young ones, innovation is critical to
welfare. But innovation works very differently in different
industries. In some industries, notably pharmaceuticals, inno-

vation tends to be a stand-alone process generating a single
finished product. Once a drug is developed and tested, it
tends not to be improved. At most, pharmaceutical companies will improve the delivery system or patent obvious chemical variants such as metabolites. By contrast, in computer
software, cumulative innovation is extraordinarily important. It is received wisdom among software consumers that
you shouldn’t buy version 1.0 of any program. The expectation is that the programs will be incrementally improved
over time. These differences in innovation have great significance for patent policy because they bear on the importance
we should attach to pioneer innovation in various sectors as
opposed to continuing improvement.
The relationship between patents and innovation is at
least as complex as the profile of technological and economic factors that determine innovation. There is no simple or universal correlation between the availability of patents and the
incentive to innovate. Indeed, as the American Enterprise
Institute’s Bob Hahn has put it, “the most general lesson to
be gleaned from the patent literature is that there are few general lessons.” This is due in part to the fact that the patent system interacts with industries at several different points in the
innovation process. Recent evidence has demonstrated that
this complex relationship is industry-specific at each stage of
the patent process: deciding to seek protection, obtaining a
patent, setting the scope of a patent, deciding to enforce a
patent, and determining litigation outcomes.
Rewriting the patent law for each industry would involve
substantial administrative costs and uncertainty. Congress
would have to write new statutes not just for biotechnology
and software, but for numerous different industries with
special characteristics. Semiconductors, pharmaceuticals,
chemicals, nanotechnology, telecommunications, and other
industries would all need separate statutes. Past experience
with such specialized statutes is also not encouraging. The history of industry-specific statutes suggests that many fail
because they are drafted with then-current technology in
mind and are not sufficiently general to accommodate the
inevitable changes in technology.
PAT E N T P O L I C Y L E V E R S

The need for industry-specific statutory tailoring implicates
the broader question of legal generalization versus particularization, of which the issue of rule-based or standardsbased decision making is, perhaps paradoxically, a particular
instance. Law necessarily contains general prescriptions for
governing behavior, prescriptions that may fit particular
instances well or poorly. Where the fit is poor, it may be sensible to equip decision makers with discretion to tailor the general prescription. The patent statute equips courts with precisely such discretion via a series of doctrinal “policy levers”
that allow patents to be calibrated to the needs of particular
industries.
For example, a number of factual questions in patent law
are answered from the perspective of the “person having ordinary skill in the art” (phosita). Much of the case law concerning the phosita arises out of the consideration of the

obviousness standard found in § 103 of the patent statute.
Although originally developed as a common law doctrine, the
non-obviousness criterion was codified in the 1952 Patent Act
as a requirement that the claimed invention taken as a whole
not be obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time
the invention was made. The phosita is equally central to calibrating the legal standard for patent disclosure. In return for
a period of exclusive rights over an invention, the inventor
must fully disclose the invention to the public. The first
paragraph of § 112 requires that this disclosure enable “any
person skilled in the art” to make and use the claimed invention. This same standard controls several other disclosure doctrines as well. First, the definition of enablement affects the
patentability requirement of specific utility, as the invention
must actually work as described in the specification if the
inventor is to enable one of ordinary skill to use it.
As the name suggests, phosita-based analysis is specific
to the particular art in which the invention is made. Courts
measure most significant patent law doctrines against a
benchmark that varies by industry, and within industry by
technology. If the court concludes that an art is uncertain and
its practitioners are not particularly skilled, it will be inclined
to find even relatively modest improvements non-obvious to
the phosita. At the same time, the court will be inclined to
require greater disclosure to satisfy the requirements of §
112, and correspondingly to narrow the scope of claims permissible from any given disclosure. If the art is predictable and
the phosita quite skilled, the reverse is also true. The result
is to make the phosita a potentially significant macro policy lever, awarding many narrow patents to some industries
and a few broader patents to other industries.
There is overwhelming evidence that the application of the
phosita standard varies by industry, leading for example to
fewer but broader valid software patents, and more but narrower biotechnology patents. It is less clear that the court is
in fact using the phosita explicitly as a policy lever, responding to the characteristics of particular industries, rather
than merely trying to predict what those of skill in the art
would think.
In 2007, the Supreme Court changed the standard of obviousness in the KSR case. Rather than focus on the existence of
a written suggestion in the prior art, the Court said, the test for
obviousness must focus on the knowledge and abilities of the
phosita, including whatever creative or innovative tendencies
the ordinary scientist in the field possessed. In one fell swoop,
the Court turned obviousness from a search for written suggestions in the prior art, regardless of industry, to a question
of what the phosita in a particular field would know or could
figure out. In so doing, KSR gave courts the power to use obviousness doctrine as a whole as a case-by-case policy lever, one
that will lead to more valid patents in industries in which the
phosita knows little or is uncreative, and more invalid patents
in industries with more sophisticated players.
EMERGING POLICY LEVERS

Patent rights are exclusive rights that fit the classic formulation of a “property rule.” Indeed, the patent right to exclude
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was regarded by the Federal Circuit as a nearly absolute property rule, and the assumption that a finding of patent infringement will be accompanied by an injunction was almost universal from the mid-1980s until 2006. In fact, however, the
patent statute provides only that courts may grant injunctive
relief, not that they must.
The legal standard for preliminary injunctive relief has vacillated over time. Preliminary injunctions were virtually impossible to obtain before the creation of the Federal Circuit. The
Federal Circuit substantially liberalized the standard for
granting such injunctions in the 1980s, but then tightened
it considerably in the 1990s, to the point where today preliminary injunctions are quite rare. The court has the discretion under the statute to do something similar with permanent injunctive relief. In copyright cases, as opposed to
patent cases, the Supreme Court has on several recent occasions encouraged the lower courts not to grant injunctive relief
as a matter of course.
On rare occasions before 2006, courts in patent cases
refused to grant permanent injunctive relief, for example in
cases where courts found a strong public policy interest in continued access to the invention. This suggests that injunctive
relief can serve as a policy lever by industry or on a case-bycase basis. Courts could deny injunctive relief in some industries altogether. Some consumer advocates suggest that lifesaving drugs ought to fit into this category, for example.
Alternatively, courts could deny injunctive relief on a case-bycase basis depending on other characteristics that differ by
industry, such as whether the plaintiff actually practices the
invention.
We recently witnessed the creation of a policy lever in real
time. In its 2006 decision in eBay v. MercExchange, the Supreme
Court rejected the longstanding rule that patentees who won
their cases were automatically entitled to an injunction shutting down the infringing product. Relying on the statutory
language and common-law principles of equity from outside patent law, the Court held that the decision whether to
enjoin a defendant’s product must be made on a case-by-case
basis after considering four (really three) factors:
Will the plaintiff suffer irreparable injury without an
injunction, or is there an adequate remedy at law?
■ Will the hardship to the defendant from granting an
injunction outweigh the hardship to the plaintiff
from denying the injunction?
■ Where does the public interest lie?
■

The Court emphasized that those determinations should be
on the basis of individual facts, not rigid rules or tests.
Dozens of district courts have applied those standards in
the past two years. Despite the case-by-case nature of the
inquiry, the district court opinions have established some general rules. Patentees who compete in the market essentially
always get injunctions under the four-factor test, because it
is extremely difficult to determine what would have happened in a counterfactual world in which the patentee actually had market exclusivity. Hence, damages are unlikely to be
adequate as a remedy for the lost market share that infringe22
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ment causes. In contrast, patentees that do not participate in
the market, but merely seek to license their patent to those
who do, can almost never satisfy the four-factor test because
by definition what they want is money damages in the form
of a reasonable royalty. Further, almost all of the non-practicing entity cases arise in complex technology industries in
which the patent covers only a small component of the larger product. In those cases, the balance of the hardships strongly favors the defendant because an injunction will shut down
not merely the infringing technology, but a much larger set
of non-infringing technologies attached to it. There is only
one exception so far to this general rule that practicing entities get injunctions and non-practicing entities don’t: an
aberrational Texas district court opinion that held that special rules should apply to nonprofit entities.
This developing distinction operates as a policy lever.
While practicing and non-practicing entities exist in every
industry, the reality is that in some industries such as pharmaceuticals, the patentees are almost all practicing entities,
while in the IT industries a high percentage of patent plaintiffs are non-practicing entities, sometimes called “trolls” for
the practice of hiding under a bridge and popping up to
demand a toll from surprised passersby. A rule that practicing entities generally get injunctions while non-practicing entities generally do not has dramatically different effects in the
pharmaceutical and IT industries. Coupled with apportionment of patent damages, a rule that limits injunctions to
plaintiffs that really need them has the potential to help
solve the problems with abuse of the patent system while preserving a strong property rule entitlement for those who
really need it.
INSTITUTIONAL ROLES

The fact that courts proved capable of solving many of the
problems on which new legislation has repeatedly foundered
suggests that policy levers, not industry-specific legislation,
may be the most effective way of dealing with problems in the
patent system. Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.), discussing the
most recent efforts at patent law reform, recently remarked
that Congress cannot leave reform to the courts because
“Congress writes our laws.” But even though Congress
undoubtedly makes the laws, frequently the best way to make
those laws work is to write them so that the details of their
application are delegated to the courts.
Skeptics of the judicial approach might rightly observe that
litigation is not cost-free, that judicial expertise is bounded,
and that appellate courts in particular are not entirely immune
from problems of public choice. However, all advantages are
comparative and the question is not whether courts are the
perfect statutory tailors, but whether we are better off with
no tailoring at all. If we’re not, then given the risks of industry-specific statutes described above, we must ask if the courts
are better situated to engage in tailoring than are legislatures. The likelihood that a unitary, unvarying, and monolithic statute could supply the correct level of incentive to so
many diverse industries with divergent incentives is essentially
nil. The prospect of the legislature continually revisiting the

circumstances of each industry and passing appropriate new
legislation for each situation is equally bleak. In democratically elected legislatures, an enormous commitment of political capital is typically required to draft, promulgate, and
reach consensus on new intellectual property legislation,
especially if the legislation is to be supported by credible
fact-finding and reliable expertise. We can anticipate serious
legislative investigation of, and response to, specialized industry needs to be relatively rare and potentially counterproductive when it does occur.
This is not to say that there cannot be a carefully modulated adjunct role for an agency — in this case, the Patent and
Trademark Office — to play in statutory upkeep. But the
pto by design sees only one piece of the patent puzzle: the
question of whether a patent should issue in the first place.
It never sees infringement disputes, or licenses, or has to
allocate remedies. As a result, even if we thought the pto were
best suited to setting industry-specific standards for determining patent validity, there is no reason to believe the pto
staff has any comparative advantage in deciding many of the
most important questions of patent law. The pto may be best
suited to creating rules that govern practice before the office
itself, such as the information applicants must submit or the
ability of applicants to use continuation applications. Most
particularly, there may be such a role if the agency can be held
to what it does best, which is fact-finding, without becoming
involved in setting legal standards, which is the strong suit of
the courts. But it is a far cry from application of the pto’s factfinding expertise to the sort of dynamic interpretation of legal
rules with which courts have experience, and which we suggest the patent system needs.
“Wait a minute!” some readers might object. “Aren’t you
arguing for judicial activism?” Not so. If “judicial activism”

means anything beyond a conclusory label suggesting that the
speaker disagrees with the court decision, it refers to courts
usurping the role of Congress, generally by invoking the
Constitution to strike down congressional statutes. We are
suggesting something different. Within the framework created
by Congress, there remain a large number of issues to be
determined, and it is the proper job of the courts to resolve
those disputes. That much has been uncontroversial since
Marbury v. Madison was decided in 1803. The question is how
courts are to resolve those issues in the absence of congressional guidance and subject to legislative veto. We think it
makes sense for courts in that position to take account of the
realities of the modern patent system. And foremost among
those realities is that our unitary patent law confronts an
amazing diversity of industry needs and experience. For
courts to ignore that diversity in setting the rules it necessarily
must set strikes us as foolish.
CO N C LUS I O N

Both innovation and patent law unquestionably work differently in different industries. The law can either take account
of those differences or seek to ignore them. Ignoring them
would require major changes in existing law. It would also
leave the law ill-equipped to deal with the fundamentally
different ways in which innovation works in different industries. Indeed, given the crisis of confidence the system currently faces, it is not much of an exaggeration to say that the
patent system must bend or break: a patent system that is not
flexible enough to account for these industry differences is
unlikely to survive, let alone accomplish its stated goals. We
believe the system has the flexibility to do both, but this will
require the courts to recognize and use the policy levers they
R
have been given.
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I. Proving Fraud in the
USPTO Post-Bose
 Medinol v. Neuro Vasx,
67 U.S.P.Q.2d 1205
(T.T.A.B. 2003)
 “Knew or should have
known standard” created
virtually strict liability in
application and
registration

I. (cont.)

Five “Hot” Questions
Post-Bose, can anyone prove fraud in the TTAB?
How will increasing court acceptance of DJ
actions affect trademark practice?
What, if anything, can we learn from recent
confusion case wins and losses?
What, if anything, can we learn from recent
dilution case wins and losses?
Has the blogger society beefed up the parody
defense?

I. (cont.)
 In re Bose

Corporation, 580 F.3d
1204 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
Overturned Medinol
WAVE and ACOUSTIC
WAVE marks registered,
but Bose had ceased
selling audio tape
recorders and players 10
years earlier
Board found fraud,
cancelled Bose’s
registration of the marks
Bose appealed cancellation

 Court of Appeals
reaffirmed high
standard for proving
fraud
 Stated that the Board
in Medinol “erroneously
lowered the fraud
standard to simple
negligence standard”
“by equating ‘should
have known’ of the
falsity with a subjective
intent”

II. Pleading Fraud in a
Cancellation Case

No longer sufficient to plead that
registrant/applicant “knew or should have
known” mark not in use
Must demonstrate registrant/applicant
“knowingly ma[d]e[] false, material
representations” “with the intent to
deceive”

Asian and Western Classics B.V. v. Selkow, 92
U.S.P.Q.2d 1478 (T.T.A.B. 2009)

E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Quala S.A., Opposition

Must demonstrate fraud “either by its own
specific factual knowledge or by specific facts
showing that it is likely to establish such a
claim”

No. 91186763 (T.T.A.B. December 7, 2009)

Petitioner must provide specific details: who,
what, when, how of the supposed fraud

Post-Bose Open Questions
 Daimlerchysler

Corp. v. American
Motors Corp., 94

U.S.P.Q.2d 1086
(T.T.A.B. 2010)
Fraud claim found
legally sufficient,
supported by specific
statements, evidence

1.

2.

 When exactly does a party’s
“mistake” or “inadvertence”
become so reckless as to
constitute the intent to deceive
element of fraud?

 What role will patent
inequitable conduct case
law play in shaping the
future of trademark fraud
cases?

Hensley Mfg. Inc. v. Propride, Inc.,

579 F. 3d 603, (6th Cir. 2009)

III. Likelihood of
Confusion– Recent
Lessons
The Designer Cases: HENSLEY and
ABBOUD

 Would there be confusion between
Jim Hensley’s marks with Hensley
Mfg. Inc., HENSLEY and HENSLEY
ARROW, and his new trailer hitch
designs with ProPride?
 NO, facts did not support a
claim: defendants no longer used
HENSLEY or HENSLEY ARROW
marks, and Jim Hensley used his
full name, not the mark HENSLEY
in marketing for ProPride

JA Apparel Corp. v. Abboud, 568 F. 3d. 390. (2d Cir.
2009) -- Key Contract Language

 “The names, trademarks, trade names, service marks, logos,
insignias, and designations identified on Schedule 1.1(a)(A), and all
trademark registrations and applications therefor and the goodwill
related thereto (collective the “Trademarks”)”
 “All rights to use and apply for the registration of the new trade
names, trademarks, service marks, logos, insignias and designations
containing the words “Joseph Abboud,” “designed by Joseph
Abboud,” “by Joseph Abboud,” “JOE,” or “JA” … (collectively, the
“New Trademarks”)”
 “Intellectual Property was defined as ‘all of the trademark
registrations, service mark registrations and applications and
copyright registrations and applications currently used by
[Abboud....] in connection with the Trademarks….’”

JA Apparel Corp. v. Abboud, 682
F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D. N.Y. 2010)

 Injunction preventing
Abboud from using his
name as a mark
 Allowed “fair use”:
Abboud’s name must be
used descriptively,
trademark “jaz” must be
displayed in ad, must
include disclaimer of
affiliation with JA Apparel

JA Apparel Corp. v. Abboud, 568 F.
3d. 390. (2d Cir. 2009)

 Court ruled that JA did not
acquire “all of Abboud’s
rights to use his name for
commercial purposes”
 The difference between
“name” and “trade name”
 Contract referred only to
use of ABBOUD as a mark

III. Likelihood of Confusion:
Practice Note
Rights to use the name must be
descriptive
Specific reference of waiving the seller’s right
to the commercial use of the personal name
prevents ambiguity
Under Section 1115(b)(4)

III. Likelihood of Confusion
and Dilution—
Cases of Interest
Hewlett Packard Development Co. v. Vudu Inc., 92

USPQ 2d 1630

Hewlett Packard opposes registration of the VUDU mark in Class 9 and four
other classes
Phonetic equivalents with the same connotation goods=computer
software=likelihood for confusion

III. Likelihood of Confusion:
Practice Note
Be careful with your description of goods
and services: tailor it to avoid possible
oppositions later
The Board can and will look to the literal
description of goods in your application
Separate applications in separate classes

Advertise.com Inc. v. AOL Advertising,
Inc. FKA August 3, 2010 F 3d. (9th Cir.)
 9th Circuit reversed entry of
preliminary injunction entered by
District Court
 AOL’S ADVERTISING.COM
registration not likely to support
finding of likelihood of confusion
with ADVERTISE.COM because of
probably generic nature of mark
 Genus=“online advertising” or
“internet advertising”
 Relevant question: What are you?
Answer: “an advertising dot
com”

IV. Clarification on
Likelihood of Dilution
CHARBUCKS
Starbucks sued Black Bear Micro Roastery for its
CHARBUCKS BLEND and MISTER CHARBUCKS
blends
District court dismissed the claim, finding no
actual dilution
Starbucks appealed…

Heads up for “Generic” Marks
 In re

HOTELS.COM, 573
f. 3d 1300
CAFC upheld refusal
to register the mark
“hotels” generic
 “.com” added
nothing
no secondary
meaning shown

III. Practice Note
Procedure oftentimes plays large role in
TTAB proceedings, despite certain realities
of the commercial marketplace
Alternative: appeal the refusal to a District
Court

Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee,

Inc. 588 F. 3d 97 (2d Cir. 2009)

Not necessary to
prove likelihood of
confusion to address
dilution claims
Starbucks’ claims of
tarnishment and
blurring both
dismissed

V. Declaratory Judgment
Actions after MedImmune

The Declaratory Judgment
Statute
The Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2201 (a), requires an “actual
controversy” between parties to the
declaratory judgment action

MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.,
549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007)

Addressed whether a
patent licensee must
be in breach of
license agreement to
bring a declaratory
judgment action
Supreme Court: no
Article III

Monster Cable Products, Inc. v. Euroflex Srl,

Vantage Trailers, Inc. v. Beall Corp., 567 F. 3d 745 (5th Cir. 2009)

-No jurisdiction where the trailer at issue was not yet finalized
-Disputed that Vantage had begun to manufacture a trailer
-Was design sufficiently fixed to allow evaluation of a trademark
infringement?

Surefoot LC v. Sure Foot Corp., 531 F. 3d 1236 (10th Cir. 2008)

642 F. Supp 2d 1001 (ND Cal. 2009)
 One of the plaintiff’s requests for
declaratory relief regarding EFI’s
three pending applications for
trademark registrations dismissed
 Plaintiff has alleged no facts that this
is a “real and substantial” dispute
 EFI marks: “MONSTER,” “EUROFLEX,”
“ITALY”
 MCP does not anticipate suit from EFL
 These factors support court’s finding:
“under the circumstances,” there is
no substantial controversy

-Will the concurrent use of the marks cause confusion?
-Sure Foot ND asserts that Surefoot UT’s use of “Surefoot” mark causes
confusion, therefore infringes on Sure Food ND’s trademark rights
-The “use of SURE-FOOT infringes on Sure Foot’s rights… and creates a
likelihood of confusion” and “there were several instances of actual confusion”
at a trade show (Sept. 2, 1998 letter)

Express Scripts, Inc. v. Intel Corp, __ F.
Supp.__ (E.D. Mo. 2010
Intel sent notification letter to filer of an
“intent to use” application for the mark
INTELLACT. Defendant is in the pharmacy
benefit management business
Application for “consulting services regarding
healthcare costs . . .pharmaceutical benefit
management services . . . Counseling in the
nature of drug therapy . . . “
Intel’s letter did not know of actual use; ESI
entitled to declaratory judgment
Practice Point: Even the most innocuous cease
and desist, even before use is known, based
on an ITU application, could trigger
jurisdiction.

What is a Trademark Parody?
Fourth Circuit:
For trademark purposes, “[a] ‘parody’ is
defined as a simple form of entertainment
conveyed by juxtaposing the irreverent
representation of the trademark with the
idealized image crated by the mark’s owner
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v.
Doughney (“PETA”), 263 F.3d 359, 366 (4th Cir.
2001)

Parody Extension in the Dilution
Statute

 Federal dilution statute excludes any “fair use, including a
nominative or descriptive fair use, or facilitation of such fair
use, of a famous mark by another person other than as a

designation of source for the person’s own goods or
services, including use in connection with—
Advertising or promotion that permits consumers to
compare goods or services; or
Identifying and parodying, criticizing, or

commenting upon the famous mark owner or the
goods or services of the famous mark owner”

15 U.S.C. §1125 (c) (3).

VI. The Parody Defense

Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Haute Diggity
Dog, 507 F. 3d 252, 260 (4th Cir. 2007)
 Where the famous mark is
particularly strong, more likely
that a parody will not impair the
mark’s distinctiveness
 Defendant’s Chewy Vuiton marks
are a successful parody and do
not blur the distinctiveness of
plaintiff’s marks

 Louis Vuitton Malletier v.
Haute Diggity Dog, 507 F. 3d
252, 260 (4th Cir. 2007)

A Case Finding No Infringement and/or
Dilution
Protectmarriage.com – Yes on 8 v. Courage
Campaign, 680 F. Supp. 2d 1225 (E.D. CA 2010)
 Organizations for and against gay
marriage
 Defendant parodied plaintiff’s logo
depicting both “parents” wearing
dresses, suggesting same-sex parents
 Used logo on website tracking a
trial related to Prop 8
 Defendant’s use protected under First
Amendment
Use relevant to expressive parody
Not explicitly misleading

PI Issued - Likely Infringement and/or
Dilution

Parody Cases Tried in
the Blogger Court

Why different from Chewy Vuiton?
Survey, plaintiff sells pet-related items

Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Vip Products, LLC, 666 F. Supp.
2d 974 (ED Missouri 2008)

VII. Really Hot Topics
Worthy of An Entire
Program
TIFFANY/EBAY and RESCUECOM
CORP/GOOGLE
Extent to which primary or secondary liability will
arise for trademark infringement for on-line
sellers and to online-advertisers

Rescuecom Corp. v. Google 562 F.

3d 123 (2d Cir. 2009)

Challenges search
engines’ practice of
selling proprietary
trademarks as ‘keywords’
Looks like the practice is
sanctioned. Similar
results in the EU

Tiffany v. eBay Inc., 600 F. 3d 93 (2d
Cir. 2010)

 eBay not liable as direct or
contributory infringer when third
parties sell infringing merchandise
 eBay’s general knowledge of
infringing sales did not impose
duty to remedy problem
 Actual knowledge standard or no
duty to take down: burden shifting
to trademark owner

Google Cases in the ECJ
 Platform liability: Does the site infringe for if
customers sell counterfeit or infringing product?
Mixed results in the EU cases – on appeal to the
ECJ
 Search engine liability: Does Google infringe for
selling Adwords, or is it a hosting service? Various
results in European cases.
 Yes, Google’s AdWords system is a hosting service
Did find use in commerce, but nominative fair
use and no likelihood of confusion
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Trademark Preliminary Injunction
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Factors
 Likely success on the merits
 Likely irreparable injury
 Balance of harms favors movant
 Public interest (not being confused)
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Trademark Preliminary Injunction

Trademark Preliminary Injunction

General presumption:
likely success on the merits > irreparable harm

2 | Trademark Law Update:
Preliminary Injunctions and
Summary Judgments

3 | Trademark Law Update:
Preliminary Injunctions and
Summary Judgments

Trademark Preliminary Injunction

Trademark Preliminary Injunction

Presumption Freight Train
New Rule?

 Copying > Presumed secondary meaning
 Copying > Presumed intent to infringe
 Intent to infringe > Presumed infringement

Recent Supreme Court cases indicate need for
independent proof of likely irreparable injury

 Infringement > Presumed irreparable injury
=
Preliminary Injunction
see Schwinn v Ross, 870 F3d 1176 (7th Cir 1989)
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Supreme Court Cases

Lower Courts
 No presumption of irreparable injury; require proof of its likelihood

 eBay v MercExChange, 547 U.S. 388 (2006)(patent
infringement; permanent injunction)
 Winter v Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. ___, 129
S.Ct. 365 (2008)(preliminary injunction; federal
environmental law; reversing 9th Circuit)

6 | Trademark Law Update:
Preliminary Injunctions and
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 N Am Med v Axiom, 522 F3d 303 (5th Cir 2008)(rule applicable to
trademark cases)
 Maxim v Quintana, 654 FSupp2d 1024 (N.D. Cal 2009)(trademark
infringement; citing Winter; plaintiffs “no longer entitled to a
presumption of irreparable harm”)
 CytoSport v Vital, 617 FSupp2d 1051 (E.D. Cal. 2009)(trademark
infringement; citing Winter; “plaintiff must demonstrate that irreparable
injury is likely”) aff’d mem 348 Fed Appx 288 (9th Cir 2009)
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Trademark Summary Judgment
Granted 2008 - 2010

Trademark Summary Judgment

“This case is yet another example of the wisdom of
the well-established principle that because of the intensely
factual nature of trademark disputes, summary judgment
is generally disfavored in the trademark arena.”
- Fortune v Victoria’s Secret, 618 F3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir 2010)
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Venture v. McGills, 540 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2008)(confusion likely)



George v. Imagination, 575 F.3d 383 (4th Cir. 2009)(confusion unlikely)



Universal v. Collezione, 618 F3d 417 (4th Cir. 2010) (confusion likely)



Bd. of Supervisors v. Smack, 550 F.3d 465 (5th Cir. 2008)(confusion likely)



General Conference v. McGill, 617 F3d 402 (6th Cir. 2010) (confusion likely)



Sensient v. Sensory Effects, 613 F.3d 754 (8th Cir. 2010) (confusion unlikely)



Utah Lighthouse v Foundation, 527 F3d 1045 (10th Cir. 2008)(confusion unlikely)



Tana v. Dantanna’s, 611 F.3d 767 (11th Cir. 2010) (confusion unlikely)



Odom’s v. FF Acquisition, 600 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (confusion unlikely)
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Trademark Summary Judgment

Trademark Summary Judgment

both for food flavorings

Confusion Likely

Confusion Unlikely

both for restaurants

Motion Denied

Confusion Likely

613 F3d 754
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Confusion Unlikely

Motion Denied
611 F3d 767
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Trademark Summary Judgment

Trademark Summary Judgment

both for conducting religious observances

Confusion Likely

Confusion Unlikely

for foods

Motion Denied

Confusion Likely

for grocery store services
Confusion Unlikely

617 F3d 402
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Motion Denied
600 F3d 1343
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Trademark Summary Judgment

Trademark Summary Judgment

both for car sales
Confusion Likely

Confusion Unlikely

Motion Denied

Confusion Likely

Confusion Unlikely

605 F3d 931
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Motion Denied
618 F3d 1025
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Trademark Summary Judgment

Trademark Summary Judgment

both for games
Confusion Likely

Confusion Unlikely

Motion Denied

Confusion Likely

576 F3d 221
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Confusion Unlikely

Motion Denied
575 F3d 383
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Trademark Summary Judgment

Trademark Summary Judgment

both for apparel
Confusion Likely

Confusion Unlikely

both for religious services
Motion Denied

Confusion Likely

550 F3d 465
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Confusion Unlikely

Motion Denied
527 F3d 1045
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